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THE INCIDENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY
Tara K. Righetti*
Abstract
State oil and gas conservation agencies are the gatekeepers to oil and
gas development: as the agencies charged with granting drilling permits,
they decide if, when, where, and how oil and gas will be developed. As
such, oil and gas conservation agencies sit on the front lines in the
emerging, and increasingly irresolvable, struggle between fossil energy
development and the environment. Current oil and gas conservation
regulation is designed to promote development, maximize recovery of the
resource, and protect the individual property rights of mineral owners.
However, advocacy by environmental constituencies, including surface
owners and local governments, has challenged the entrenched paradigm
whereby production must be maximized at the expense of all other
interests. These efforts are pushing courts to redefine oil and gas
conservation according to twenty-first century environmental values. This
Article examines the emergent environmental regulation function of oil
and gas conservation agencies and identifies opportunities for these
agencies to regulate according to their historic mandates in a manner that
is inclusive of public values.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................686
II. CONSERVATION LAW: PURPOSE AND HISTORY .............................................690
III. THE ROLE OF STATE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION AGENCIES....................701
A. Statutory Authority and Jurisdiction.........................................................701
1. Preventing Waste .................................................................................703
2. Protecting Correlative Rights ...............................................................705
3. Encouraging Efficient Development .....................................................707
4. Health, Safety, Public Welfare and the Environment.............................708
B. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions........................................................711
IV. REDEFINING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ................................................713
A. Before the Agency: Petitions for Rulemaking............................................715
1. Increased Setbacks ...............................................................................719
*

© 2020 Tara K. Righetti. SER Associate Professor of Oil and Gas Law, University of
Wyoming College of Law. I received valuable comments on earlier drafts from Jason
Robison, Alex Ritchie, Heidi Robertson, members of the junior faculty research colloquia at
the University of Wyoming, and from presentation of the topic during the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation 64th Annual Institute. Aspects of the paper are discussed in
Environmental Considerations in Conservation and Permitting, 64 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST. 5-1 (2018). Madeleine Lewis (JD/MA ’19) and Connor Thompson (JD ’20) provided
invaluable research and editorial assistance.

685

686

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

2. Climate and Landscape-Scale Environmental Impacts..........................721
B. At the Ballot Box ......................................................................................723
C. In the Courts............................................................................................725
V. CONSERVATION REIMAGINED: AMENDING AGENCY AUTHORITY .................735
A. Conflicts, Capture, and Capability ...........................................................742
VI. AN INTENTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY .............................................746
VII. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................753
I. INTRODUCTION
Conservation agencies, such as the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission (WOGCC) and the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC), regulate oil
and gas operations for the purposes of preventing waste and protecting correlative
rights.1 In all states with significant hydrocarbon production, a mineral rights holder
must apply for and obtain authorization from the state conservation agency prior to
locating and drilling an oil and gas well on state or private land.2 This authority
provides for the conservation of subsurface oil and gas resources for future
production and use.3 Exercised judiciously, it is also a powerful force for the
conservation of surface resources and protection of the environment. In the nearly
120 years since the first conservation acts and oil and gas waste prevention statutes
were enacted, 4 regulation by conservation agencies has curtailed the environmental
impacts associated with oil and gas exploration and production by limiting
unnecessary drilling, thereby lowering energy inputs associated with extraction and
preserving surface resources.5
In response to heightened concerns over the environmental and climate impacts
of oil and gas development, advocates, conservationists, voters, and legislators are
reexamining the environmental regulation role of oil and gas conservation agencies.6
The goals of conservation regulation and the tools available to commissions have
changed little since Howard Williams wrote his first article on conservation in 1952.7
Public attitudes towards conservation, however, are changing. Motivated by
1
1 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE H. KRAMER, THE LAW OF POOLING AND
UNITIZATION, § 3.02[4] (3d ed. 2017).
2
1 NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 5:1 (3d ed. 2019).
3
See id. § 4:1.
4
See, e.g., Walter L. Summers, Modern Theory and Practical Application of Statutes
for the Conservation of Oil and Gas, 13 TUL. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1938).
5
See generally David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas
Development by Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 759 (2009)
(discussing transition “of rights in oil and gas reservoirs away from capture rights and toward
correlative rights” with the result that “state oil and gas conservation commissions can
[maximize] development of the oil and gas resource . . . while minimizing the impact on
surface and other natural resources”).
6
See infra Part III.
7
See Howard Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1952).

2020]

THE INCIDENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY

687

increased awareness of and concern about environmental and climate impacts,
landowners and environmental groups are demanding that conservation agencies
exercise their authority to enhance environmental protections and consider issues
related to the environment and climate change in making permitting and other
decisions.8 Citizens, states, and counties are attempting to compensate for the lack
of any comprehensive federal greenhouse gas legislation and to respond to and
prevent highly publicized environmental and human health tragedies through
lawsuits, agency petitions, and legislation.9 Meanwhile, state conservation agencies
are issuing record numbers of permits.10
Conservation agencies have been resistant to external pressures to adopt more
aggressive environmental rules.11 More than ever before, commissions are asked to
look beyond the drill site spacing unit and reservoir to incorporate the cumulative
and landscape-scale impacts of conservation agency decisions on the environment.
Oil and gas conservation agencies have been bombarded by protests, requests for
rulemaking, and applications to intervene in administrative proceedings calling for
the conservation agencies to consider environmental impacts as part of their permit
approval.12 On average, the agencies have been disinclined to take on these requests,
finding that doing so would exceed the scope of their delegated authority.13
This Article considers pressures on state oil and gas conservation agencies to
take an expanded role in regulating the environmental impacts associated with oil
and gas production on private land14 and examines the emerging role of oil and gas
8

See infra Section III.A. These demands may be in response to Professor Pierce’s call
to action, supra note 5, at 773–78.
9
See infra Part III.
10
See Greg Avery, Oil and Gas Companies Are Seeking New Well Permits Like Never
Before, DENVER BUS. J. (June 7, 2018, 8:44 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news
/2018/06/05/oil-and-gas-companies-are-seeking-new-well-permits.html [https://perma.cc/E
7MJ-N59S]; Heather Richards, Powder River Basin Inspires 10,000-Permit Drilling Battle
from Oil and Gas Companies, CASPER STAR TRIB. (May 13, 2018),
https://trib.com/business/energy/powder-river-basin-inspires--permit-drilling-battle-fromoil/article_a2766b4f-8959-51df-baa1-4b4af1fcc2b3.html [https://perma.cc/VB76-6P6S].
11
See infra Section IV.A.
12
See infra Part III.
13
See id.
14
An analysis of the environmental protection function of the federal oil and gas
permitting process is beyond the scope of this article. Where oil and gas development occur
on federal lands, numerous laws and regulations—including the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331, 4332–4335, 4341–4347 (2018))—require consideration of
environmental impacts, even where development is achieved by directional drilling into
federal minerals from entirely non-federal surface locations. See generally BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., PIM No. 2018-014, DIRECTIONAL DRILLING INTO FEDERAL MINERAL ESTATE FROM
WELL PADS ON NON-FEDERAL LOCATIONS (2018) (issuing guidance for agency personnel
on complying with federal environmental laws when issuing permits and leases to extract
federal-owned minerals from non-federal lands).
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conservation commissions as an environmental agency. Part II begins with a
description of conservation law and regulations and a brief history of oil and gas
regulation and the conservation purpose of oil and gas conservation agencies.15 Part
II also emphasizes the historical background and rationales that underpin state
conservation law.16 It characterizes the naissance of conservation law as emerging
from a period when environmental degradation was considered the implicit right of
the industry.
Part III describes conservation agencies’ scope of authority.17 Traditionally, the
agencies’ functions are delegated for the purposes of preventing waste and
protecting correlative rights.18 However, in many cases, language embedded within
the agencies’ enabling statutes introduces the possibility of more expansive
authority.19 The sources of expanded authority include definitions of waste that
encompass actions contributing to environmental degradation, delegations of
authority over state environmental programs, or language requiring the agency to
protect health, safety, and the environment.20 Part III highlights how these
authorizations suggest an increased environmental regulatory function for state
conservation agencies.
Parts IV and V examine recent efforts to require oil and gas conservation
agencies to consider a more inclusive scope of environmental factors, including
climate change. Part IV explores efforts by environmental constituencies to
democratize or circumvent conservation agencies and achieve standing in
administrative proceedings.21 These efforts include requests for rulemaking from
environmental advocates, voter initiatives, and challenges to agency decisions on
the basis of environmental harms.22 Agencies have been reluctant to interpret
environmental protection language in their enabling acts as authorizing landscapescale environmental regulation, instead focusing on their traditional roles of
maximizing hydrocarbon recovery and protecting the personal property interests of
the owners of mineral rights within the reservoir.23 As a result, there has been a flurry
of litigation considering the scope of commission authority and the agencies’
obligations to engage in administrative rulemaking or to consider broader
environmental impacts as a part of carrying out their statutory duties.24 These

15

See infra Part I.
See id.
17
See infra Part II.
18
See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
19
See infra Sections II.A.3, II.A.4.
20
See id.
21
See infra Parts III, IV.
22
Id.
23
See Pierce, supra note 5, at 759–61.
24
See, e.g., Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22
(2019); Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Dep’t of Conservation, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 517 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2017); City of Longmont v. Colorado Oil and Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573 (2016);
16
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proceedings sometimes confer standing, or the potential for standing, on new parties
where certain environmental views have not previously had an advocate; in other
instances, courts expand the factors that agencies must take into consideration when
exercising their delegated authority.25 Part V examines attempts to reform agency
authority, including legislative actions preempting or limiting commission authority
and influence by governors.26 The reform efforts have sought to restructure
conservation agencies to structurally decrease the influence of industry voices, shift
agency philosophies away from the promotion of development, increase the
regulatory authority of local governments, and require conservation agencies to limit
or mitigate environmental impacts.27
Part VI considers the appropriate role of oil and gas conservation agencies in
environmental regulation of oil and gas development.28 This analysis includes an
examination of efforts to reform conservation agencies as new environmental
regulators and how these efforts may fail to achieve the comprehensive changes
many advocates desire.29 In many cases, agencies may not have statutory
authorization or expertise to engage in the fact-finding necessary to meet the
emergent demands for more stringent environmental regulation at the conservation
level.30 These efforts hazard muddling the regulatory environment and introducing
uncertainties in an otherwise efficient permitting process. Concurrently, reforms
may diminish the efficacy of conservation agencies in pursuing the public policy
interests with which they are charged.31 State oil and gas commissions were not
originally formed to investigate and answer existential questions about the
appropriate balance between environmental conservation and fossil energy
development, and they are not currently equipped to do so; thus, it would not be
appropriate for them to make these determinations.32
However, there are opportunities for agencies to reduce environmental impacts,
prevent waste, and streamline agency proceedings. Structural and legal changes
would further reduce concerns of undue influence by the industry and agency
dependence. Part VI ends by exploring opportunities for conservation agencies to
more effectively limit the environmental impacts of oil and gas development by
encouraging collaborative, multi-agency, resource-scale planning. This Article
argues that legal reforms should be tailored to complement existing agency authority
and require consultation with more appropriately tasked environmental agencies.33
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth (Robinson IV), 147 A.3d 536 (Pa. 2016); Robinson Twp.
v. Commonwealth (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
25
See infra Section III.C.
26
See infra Part IV.
27
Id.
28
See infra Part V.
29
Id.
30
See id.
31
See infra Part IV.
32
See infra Part IV.
33
See infra Part V, at notes 311–57.

690

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

Environmental activism before conservation agencies, like that seen within
counties, local governments, and other administrative bodies involved in permitting
fossil development, is likely to increase.34 Environmental awareness and concern for
the externalities associated with oil and gas development has grown while
development in other sectors has diminished the economic impact of extractive
industries, thus leading to opposition—even in traditionally fossil fuel-producing
regions.35 Meanwhile, the number of wells drilled and total production have grown
significantly, and horizontal drilling technologies have facilitated development
within residential communities.36 Homeowner concerns regarding the diminution of
property values associated with nearby energy development have resulted in local
opposition to energy development.37 Through efforts at the ballot box, in state
legislatures, and in the courts, oil and gas conservation agencies are emerging as
new, though perhaps unwitting, environmental agencies.
II. CONSERVATION LAW: PURPOSE AND HISTORY
During the conservation movement, when the majority of oil and gas
conservation laws were enacted, conservation was understood as tempering present
use of finite resources to preserve them for future generations.38 Gifford Pinchot,
often identified as the founder of the conservation movement,39 defined conservation
34

See, e.g., James W. Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental
Assessment of Energy Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 122–23 (describing
the Keystone Effect of requiring climate assessments of energy transport projects); Kristen
van de Biezenbos, Where Oil Is King, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631, 1634–35, 1671 (2017).
35
Biezenboz, supra note 34, at 1633–34. For instance, the marijuana industry recently
displaced oil and gas as the primary economic driver in some rural Colorado communities.
See Leah Todd, Rural Economies Get High on Legal Cannabis, HIGH COUNTY NEWS, Nov.
15,
2016,
https://www.hcn.org/articles/rural-economies-get-high-on-legal-cannabis
[https://perma.cc/CUJ5-7XBL]; Alexandra B. Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 679–80 (2008) (citing THOMAS MICHAEL POWER & RICHARD N.
BARRETT, POST-COWBOY ECONOMICS 55 (2001)); see also WILLIAM R. TRAVIS, NEW
GEOGRAPHIES OF THE AMERICAN WEST 3 (2007); John Cox, Overwhelming Opposition to
Oil Activity May Present Challenge to Local Industry, THE RECORD, Jan. 24, 2019,
https://www.bakersfield.com/delano-record/overwhelming-opposition-to-oil-activity-maypresent-challenge-to-local/article_d1129c5c-1b6d-11e9-b06c-43574098b033.html [https://
perma.cc/B3WZ-ARB9].
36
See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS WELLS BY
PRODUCTION RATE 1 (2018), https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/wells/annual/archive/2018/pdf
/full_report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QQ7-GMF9]; Duruigbo, Fracking and the NIMBY
Syndrome, 26 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 227, 234–35 (2018).
37
David B. Spence, Responsible Shale Gas Production: Moral Outrage vs. Cool
Analysis, 25 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 183 (2013)
38
Jedediah Purdy, American Natures: The Shape of Conflict in Environmental Law, 36
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 169, 173 (2012).
39
ORRIS HERFINDAHL, WHAT IS CONSERVATION 2 (1961).
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as the “use of natural resources for the greatest good of the greatest number [of
people] for the longest time.”40 Thus, the ideal reflected in conservation regulation
requires both development and protection.41 Like the concept of sustainable
development, this definition of conservation may seem like an oxymoron—
involving conflicting mandates of preservation and consumption of a fixed good.42
Similarly, geologic conservation in the context of oil and gas is traditionally
interpreted as encouraging development so as to maximize the total recoverable oil
or gas from the reservoir.43 In so doing, conservation simultaneously advances
society’s public interest in the development, production, and use of natural resources
while also protecting each individual property owner’s economic interest in the
minerals under his or her property.
Oil and gas conservation law is essential to the protection of surface and
subsurface resources. Conservation law originated in response to the reckless waste
of oil and gas and environmental devastation resulting from the unconstrained
application of the rule of capture.44 The rule of capture provides that the title to oil
and gas is obtained through production and severance of the hydrocarbons45 at the
surface, regardless of whether some of those hydrocarbons may have migrated into
the well from adjoining land that is not beneath the confines of the property of the
producer.46 Actual, rather than conceptual, ownership of fluid or gaseous minerals
requires a property interest in a producing well.47 This common law rule incentivizes
the mineral owner of a tract of land, however small, to drill anywhere on the tract
and in whatever density it can manage in order to capture as much of the common
resource as possible.48 Other mineral owners and lessees whose subsurface rights
extend within the same reservoir may then experience drainage, and are
consequently left without a remedy except to drill their own wells—a concept known

40

Id. (citing GIFFORD PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 326 (1947)).
Jan G. Laitos & Catherine M. H. Kesket, The Right of Nonuse, 25 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 303, 309–10 (2012).
42
See Michael Redclift, Sustainable Development (1987–2005): An Oxymoron Comes
of Age, 13 SUSTAINABLE DEV. 212, 224–25 (2005).
43
Williams, supra note 7, at 1156 (oil and gas conservation is more or less coterminous
with “attaining maximum production from known fields by more efficient utilization of
reservoir energy”).
44
See Pierce, supra note 5, at 760–61; Williams, supra note 7, at 1158–59.
45
A hydrocarbon is an organic chemical compound of hydrogen and carbon, which
includes methane (CH4) and petroleum, as well as other, heavier and more complex
molecules. See PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, MANUAL
OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 494 (Ellen B. Siegel et al. eds., 10th ed. 1997) (definition of
“hydrocarbon”) [hereinafter MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS].
46
Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561–62 (Tex. 1948); Robert E.
Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L.
REV. 391, 393 (1935).
47
Pierce, supra note 5, at 762, 765.
48
See Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719 (Pa. 1893).
41
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as the offset drilling rule.49 Failure of any oil and gas lessee to respond by offset
drilling not only results in forfeiture of his property through drainage of the reservoir
but may also result in liability to other mineral interest owners within the property
for royalties that would have been owed had a well to prevent drainage been
drilled.50 As a result, the industry becomes dominated by a scarcity mindset and a
development imperative:51 capture and profit from all within your dominion or risk
losing everything.52
The early days following an oil discovery were characterized by “profligate
drilling and tremendous physical waste.”53 Following the 1859 discovery of the
Drake well in Titusville, Pennsylvania, oil and gas development experienced a
frenzy where new wells “sprang up like new shoots after rain,” which sent “land
prices soaring and would-be oil men scrambling for leases.”54 Oil was carried in
whiskey barrels and wooden vats and allowed to run out over the land into pits.55
Forty years later, in January of 1901 in Beaumont, Texas, the Spindletop discovery
precipitated another boom following publication of a photo of the Lucas gusher and
a massive overstatement of production volumes.56 Within a month there were
thirteen rigs, and by October there were 440 wells—some on “postage stamp size
sites.”57 Similar to what occurred in Titusville, prices plummeted; within a few
months, a barrel of oil sold for less than a cup of water.58 Surface fires and explosions
at primitive refineries decimated whole blocks of land, leakage and evaporation were
49

See Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802–03 (Pa. 1907); Kelly
v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897).
50
Barnard, 65 A. at 802–03; Texaco Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n of State of N.D., 448
N.W.2d 621, 623 n.2 (N.D. 1989) (citing MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45,
at 519 (definition of “rule of capture”)); Patrick H. Martin, A Modern Look at Implied
Covenants to Explore, Develop, and Market Under Mineral, 27 INST. OIL & GAS L. & TAX’N
177 (1976), reprinted in 3 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 401, 425 (2017);
PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 868
(2019) [hereinafter OIL AND GAS LAW]; see generally MAURICE H. MERRILL, THE LAW
RELATING TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES ch. 5, §§ 93–117 (2d ed. 1940).
51
See SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, SCARCITY: WHY HAVING TOO
LITTLE MEANS SO MUCH 5–14 (2013); Anuj K. Shah et al., Some Consequences of Having
Too Little, 338 SCIENCE 682, 682 (2012) (“Resource scarcity creates its own mindset,
changing how people look at problems and make decisions.”).
52
DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION
24–25 (1981).
53
See Williams, supra note 7, at 1159.
54
JUDITH LINSLEY ET AL., GIANT UNDER THE HILL: A HISTORY OF THE SPINDLETOP OIL
DISCOVERY AT BEAUMONT, TEXAS, IN 1901, at 12 (2008).
55
DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 28–30
(2008).
56
Id. at 82–86; see also Darren Dochuk, Blessed by Oil, Cursed with Crude: God and
Black Gold in the American Southwest, 99 J. AM. HIST. 51, 51–52 (2012).
57
LINSLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 131, 150; YERGIN, supra note 55, at 86.
58
YERGIN, supra note 55, at 30, 86.
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prolific, and unmanaged poisonous gasses resulted in the fatalities of people and
animals.59 Yet, for all its destruction, Spindletop ushered in a new era of steamship
companies and oil-fired locomotives, and with it a global appetite for oil that
continues into the present day.60
Unconstrained, the rule of capture presents a classic tragedy of the commons
problem.61 Not surprisingly, the application of the rule of capture to early production
led to ruination. It resulted in excessive development, resource misallocation, and
gross economic and geologic waste.62 The rule of capture encouraged behavior that
injured the rights of others to the common source of supply by stranding
hydrocarbon resources underground. Excessive drilling wastes subsurface resources
through the unnecessary and accelerated dissipation of reservoir energy created by
natural subsurface forces such as pressure, gas, and water, which “propel the oil or
gas to the wellbore.”63 Loss of this energy may render portions of the oil or gas
unrecoverable.64 Production from the reservoir by these primary sources of energy
can result in the recovery of up to 20% of the total original oil in place.65 If
subsurface reservoir pressures are unnecessarily depleted, more of that oil and gas
will become immobilized underground and will be unrecoverable without artificial
pressurization through expensive, energy-intensive enhanced recovery techniques.66
Thus, preservation of optimal reservoir energy maximizes total economic recovery
and prevents the physical waste of oil and gas. These scientific principles, however,
are directly in conflict with the production incentive created by the rule of capture.
As Professor Patrick Martin writes, “[r]easonable development for the lessor [and
lessee] historically has meant overdevelopment for the country,” leading to
“extravagant, wasteful consumption of petroleum and too rapid a depletion of this
finite resource.”67 Where each mineral owner is incentivized to “capture” as much
oil and gas as possible through production from its individual tract, the resultant
59

LINSLEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 167.
YERGIN, supra note 55, at 86–87.
61
See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to
Enron, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVT’L L. 187, 187, 191 (2004); Pierce, supra note 5, at
763.
62
See Patrick H. Martin, What the Frack? Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative
Responses to a New Drilling Paradigm, 68 ARK. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (2015).
63
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45 (definition of “reservoir energy”).
64
See Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1219–20 (1938).
65
AMERICAN PETROLEUM INST., BULL D-14, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF CRUDE OIL
RECOVERY AND RECOVERY EFFICIENCY (2d ed., 1984), https://pslcolombia.com/documentos
/BULL%20D14%20Statistical%20Analysis%20of%20Crude%20Oil%20Recovery%20and
%20Re1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VL4-99N3].
66
Enhanced Oil Recovery, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/fe/scienceinnovation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oil-recovery [https://perma.cc/4TK9-PTXE] (last
visited Jan. 1, 2019); Klaas van ’t Veld & Owen R. Phillips, The Economics of Enhanced Oil
Recovery: Estimating Incremental Oil Supply and CO2 Demand in the Powder River Basin,
31 ENERGY J. 31, 32 (2010).
67
Martin, supra note 50, at 423.
60
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overdevelopment and rapid drawdown of resources can enfeeble field-wide pressure
maintenance.
The rule of capture also contributes to waste by encouraging rapid drilling and
development before adequate gathering and pipeline infrastructure is developed to
handle the natural gas that is produced with, or as a constituent of, oil in oil wells.68
This gas, which includes natural gas and casinghead gas, may result from a gas cap
associated with an oil zone or separation of hydrocarbons in solution.69 Thus,
production of oil is not possible without some concomitant production of gas. The
drilling imperatives, which may result from high commodity prices, lease
expirations, and the threat of drainage, encourage operators to drill and complete oil
wells without the infrastructure necessary for the capture and sale of associated
gas.70 Natural gas that cannot be economically or expeditiously captured, sold, or
stored is vented or flared.71 As a result, not only is the natural gas commodity itself
wasted, rather than put to productive end use, but also the pressure of the oil reservoir
is depleted through the extraction of gas that provides some of the reservoir energy.72
The common law has long imposed a duty upon owners of common resources
not to commit waste.73 Waste and its associated environmental impacts, however,
are not an incidental byproduct of oil and development; they are by design. In the
early days of oil exploration, courts upheld the right of an owner to flare or vent gas
it had captured at the surface. In 1893, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hague v.
Wheeler74 held that the rule of capture protected the operator of a gas well from
liability when, having no market for its gas, it elected to flare all of the natural gas
it captured.75 The court held that, since the operator was not acting negligently or
maliciously, and since the post-capture waste did not injure the property or health of

68

See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S.
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1009–12 (2015); see also N.D. PIPELINE
AUTH., NORTH DAKOTA NATURAL GAS: A DETAILED LOOK AT NATURAL GAS GATHERING
9–11 (2013), https://ndpipelines.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/ndpa-detailed-look-at-gasgathering-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/3934-7E9T].
69
Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Products Inc., 794 S.W.2d 20, 22–25 (Tex. 1990);
Martin v. Kostner, 644 P.2d 430, 433–35 (Kan. 1982).
70
Monika U. Ehrman, Lights Out in the Bakken: A Review and Analysis of Flaring
Regulation and Its Potential Effects on North Dakota Shale Oil Production, 117 W. VA. L.
REV. 549, 574 (2014).
71
Id. at 557.
72
Phillip E. Norvell, The History of Oil and Gas Conservation Legislation in Arkansas,
68 ARK. L. REV. 349, 367 (2015).
73
Jill M. Fraley, A New History of Waste Law: How a Misunderstood Doctrine Shaped
Ideas About the Transformation of Law, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 861, 867 (2017) citing RICHARD
R. POWELL, 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000).
74
Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719–20 (Pa. 1893).
75
Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVT’L L. 899, 907–08 (2005).
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others,76 the producer could retain title to the gas produced from its land without fear
of injunction or liability for conversion.77
Concerns about the waste, overproduction, and price instability resulting from
the unconstrained rule of capture eventually elicited government intervention
through conservation regulations.78 By 1920, there were already serious concerns
about depletion of oil and gas resources and the need for international sources to
secure a stable supply.79 Early conservation measures took the form of statutes
prohibiting certain actions that were deemed wasteful.80 The early reforms included
prohibitions on long-term flaring or allowing a well to become wild or ignite,
mandates requiring the proper plugging of abandoned wells, and rules limiting
production to some portion of a well’s maximum capacity.81 In many states, these
first conservation laws did not include well location and density regulations, such as
spacing or pooling,82 to limit the number of wells drilled and prevent drainage
between tracts.83 Instead, the focus of early conservation laws was to avoid spillage
or venting into the atmosphere, rather than seeking to ensure efficient reservoir
development.84
However, the new reforms quickly ran afoul of the prevailing views of common
law property ownership principles created by the rule of capture. Regulation of oil
76

Id. see also Breaux v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 163 So. 2d 406, 412 (La. Ct. App.
1964); Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 562 (Tex. 1948).
77
Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562.
78
Legislation: Oil and Gas Conservation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1138–40 (1930)
[hereinafter Oil and Gas Conservation]; Weaver, supra note 61, at 187; Noel F. Delporte,
The California Oil-Gas Conservation Acts, 16 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 234, 237 (1931); Thomas
A. Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurisprudence: Past as Prologue, 49
WASHBURN L.J. 379, 414 (2010); Norvell, supra note 72, at 349.
79
David White, The Petroleum Resources of the World, 89 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI. 111, 111–15 (1920).
80
Peter D. Junger, The Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Private Rights and
Public Policy, 13 WYO. L.J. 1, 5 (1958).
81
Id. at 5–6; Higgins Oil Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211 (1919); OIL AND
GAS LAW, supra note 50, § 3.01; Norvell, supra note 72, at 364–65; Oil and Gas
Conservation, supra note 78, at 1138.
82
Spacing designates the number of wells over and oil and gas reservoir and the density
which they can be drilled for conservation purposes, whereas pooling refers to the
combination of small tracts among adjacent owners to conform to the spacing pattern in order
to receive a permit. MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 802–03, 1178–79
(definitions of “pooling” and “well spacing,” respectively).
83
J. Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production,
41 YALE L.J. 33, 39 (1931); J. Howard Marshall & Norma. L. Meyers, Legal Planning of
Petroleum Production: Two Years of Proration, 42 YALE. L.J. 702, 739 (1933); Norvell,
supra note 72, at 367–68; Oil and Gas Conservation, supra note 78.
84
Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19, 21 (Ind. 1897); SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:2;
Robert E. Sullivan, The History and Purpose of Conservation Law, in ROCKY MTN. MIN. L.
INST., 18A OIL & GAS CONSERVATION LAW & PRACTICE, 1-1, 1-17, 1-18 (1985).
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and gas development and prohibitions on waste limited the rights of mineral owners
to maximize their ownership through capture.85 In response, mineral owners filed
lawsuits asserting that state conservation regulations constituted a taking of their
common law property interests without adequate compensation.86 The U.S. Supreme
Court considered these claims in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana.87 While remaining true to
principals of the rule of capture, the Court rejected arguments that regulations
preventing waste constituted an unconstitutional taking of the mineral owners’
property.88 Instead, the Court upheld Indiana’s conservation law as a valid exercise
of the state’s police power to regulate private property to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare by preventing the damage that natural gas waste would have on
the public and other mineral owners.89 Finding that a legislative modification of the
common law rule of capture did not effect a total taking of the mineral owners’
property rights, the Supreme Court wrote that legislative power “can be manifested
for the purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing a just distribution,
to arise from the enjoyment, by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and
to reach the like end by preventing waste.”90
As conservation regulations proliferated, producing states sought to advance
conservation objectives through stability and uniformity of laws across common
regions and preserve the rights of states to control and regulate oil and gas
production.91 These states organized a committee, and with the approval of President
Theodore Roosevelt, called a meeting in 1933 for the purpose of entering a
compact.92 Consequently, in 1935, Congress approved the Interstate Compact to
Conserve Oil and Gas (IOC), which requires member states to “conserve oil and gas
by the prevention of physical waste . . . .”93 The IOC created the Interstate Oil
Compact Commission (IOC Commission), now the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact

85

Kramer & Anderson, supra note 75, at 914.
Id. at 914–16.
87
177 U.S. 190, 200–02 (1900).
88
Id. at 212; see also Kramer & Anderson, supra note 75, at 912–13.
89
Ohio Oil Co., 177 U.S. at 212.
90
Id. at 209–10. These rationales continue to be cited in modern oil and gas
jurisprudence relative to a state’s police powers to regulate oil and gas. See, e.g., Wildgrass
Oil and Gas Comm. v. Colorado, No. 1:19:cv-00190-RBJ-NYW, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
46744, at *36 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2020) (dismissing case after finding that plaintiff did “not
provide[] any case law suggesting that these binding precedents [upholding oil and gas
regulations under the police power] should be ignored or should not apply to this statute”).
91
Earl Foster, The Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas and Its Real Effect on
True Conservation, 1947 A.B.A. SEC. MINERAL & NAT. RES. L. PROC. 23, 23 (1947).
92
Id. at 24; Blakely M. Murphy, The Oil States Advisory Committee, A Predecessor of
the Compact, in CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS: A LEGAL HISTORY 545 (Blakely M. Murphy
ed., 1948).
93
Joint Resolution Consenting to an Interstate Oil Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas,
art. II, H.R.J. Res. 407, 74th Cong. 49 Stat. 939, 940 (1935) [hereinafter Interstate Oil
Compact]; see also Junger, supra note 80, at 5; Sullivan, supra note 84, at 1–17.
86
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Commission, as its governing body.94 Ratification of the IOC coincided with the
passage of conservation laws in several ratifying states.95 Six major producing states
initially ratified the IOC, though almost all oil-producing states are now members.96
The IOC significantly shaped conservation law.97 By the end of the 1930s,
Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas had passed legislation
creating conservation agencies or delegating authority to existing agencies to
regulate oil and gas production activities.98 However, it was not until the mid-1940s
and early 1950s that a majority of states adopted comprehensive conservation
regulations, including modern conservation techniques such as spacing and
pooling.99 In 1949, the IOC Commission drafted a model conservation statute to
effectuate the main goals of the IOC: preventing waste and preserving correlative
rights.100 The model statute went beyond previous conservation measures by
providing authority to create drilling units and require cost-sharing between owners
within a unit.101 Shortly thereafter, Colorado and Wyoming enacted conservation
legislation in 1951,102 and Pennsylvania enacted its Oil and Gas Conservation Law
in 1961.103 Today, every oil-and-gas-producing state has some form of oil and gas
conservation regulation.104 Conservation regulations have developed consistently
with the purposes advanced by the IOC and the model statute.105 While specific
94

Interstate Oil Compact, art. VI, 49 Stat. at 940; Blakely M. Murphy, Administrative
Mechanism of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas: The Interstate Oil Compact
Commission, 1935–1948, 22 TUL. L. REV. 384, 387 (1948).
95
Foster, supra note 91, at 24–25.
96
See Member States, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N,
http://iogcc.ok.gov/member-states [https://perma.cc/2TBX-ENFF] (last visited Feb. 27,
2020) (map showing current membership in the IOC); Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil
and Gas, NAT’L CTR. FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS, http://apps.csg.org/ncic/Compact.aspx?
id=81 [https://perma.cc/F3NC-RRMC] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
97
See generally Kemp Wilson, Conservation Acts and Correlative Rights: Has the
Pendulum Swung Too Far?, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1 (1989) (presenting an update
and analysis of state conservation legislation since 1950).
98
Hardwicke, supra note 46, at 420; see A.W. Walker, Jr., Property Rights in Oil and
Gas and Their Effect Upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 380–381
(1938); see also Wilson, supra note 97, at 18-2.
99
See 6 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, parts 1 & 2 (2000).
100
Barth P. Jiggs Walker, Discussion: A Model Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 26 TUL.
L. REV. 267, 269–70 (1952).
101
Thomas A. Daily, Rules Done Right: How Arkansas Brought Its Oil and Gas Law
into a Horizontal World, 68 ARK. L. REV. 259, 264 (2015).
102
See Oil and Gas Conservation Act, ch. 230, 1951 Colo. Sess. Laws 651 (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-101–131 (2019)); Oil and Gas Conservation Act,
ch. 94, 1951 Wyo. Sess. Laws 120 (codified as amended at WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-101–
28 (2019)).
103
See Oil and Gas Conservation Law, 1961 Pa. Laws 825 (codified at 58 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 401–19 (2019)); see also Mitchell, supra note 78, at 404–05.
104
See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:2.
105
See Sullivan, supra note 84, at 1-19.
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language varies among producing states, “the basic pattern is essentially the
same.”106
Modern oil and gas conservation law addresses four principal types of waste:
underground waste, surface waste, economic waste, and market waste.107
Underground waste is waste that results from the dissipation of reservoir energy
through over-drilling or over-production.108 Commissions frequently have broad
delegations of authority to enact reasonable rules or orders for waste prevention.109
Spacing rules, for example, prohibit drilling on tracts that are smaller than the area
which can reasonably be drained by one well, thus limiting over-drilling that might
result from an unconstrained application of the traditional rule of capture.110
Pooling111 and unitization112 allow adjacent mineral interests within a spacing unit
to be combined, creating a common source of supply or development as a uniform
whole. These regulatory measures protect the correlative rights of adjacent owners
from drainage and encourage enhanced production techniques that support field-

106

Id. at 1-18.
See Note, Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-State Conflict, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 888, 891–92 (1964); SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:5; KANSAS. STAT. ANN. § 55602 (1939).
108
See Conservation of Natural Gas and the Federal-State Conflict, supra note 107, at
891–92.
109
See Walker v. J-W Operating Co., 2012-0662 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/21/2012); 2012
WL 6677913, at *3 (commission sought to prevent waste by issuing permits for alternate
wells upon a finding that one well could not effectively drain the unit, drawing upon broad
delegation of authority to commission to enact “any reasonable rules, regulations, and
orders” necessary to carry out purpose of conservation act (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:4
(1950)), writ denied, 2013-C-0185 (La. 4/1/13); 110 So. 3d 582; see also MARTIN &
KRAMER, supra note 1, at ch. 5.
110
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(2) (2018); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (2019);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-17 (2019); Brown v. Humble
Oil & Ref. Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, 944 (Tex. 1935); Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing
Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99, 107 (1952)
(citing Gulf Land Co. v. Atlantic Refining Co., 131 S.W.2d 73, 80 (Tex. 1939)).
111
See supra note 81 and accompanying text; see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72302(e)(2) (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-116(7)(a) (2019); NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-909(2)
(2019); N.M. STAT. ANN § 70-2-17(c) (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (2019); WASH.
REV. CODE § 78.52.250(4) (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-109(f) (2019); Bruce M.
Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative
Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 255, 276–78 (1986).
112
Unitization, often used alongside pooling to accomplish similar results under
spacing rules, is the “joint operation of all or some portion of a performing reservoir.”
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 1143; see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 15-72308–315 (2019); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3640 (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1301–
17 (2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:5.1 (1950); MISS. CODE ANN. § 53-3-7 (2019); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 70-7-1–21 (2019); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 287.1–.15 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-5-110 (2019). Notably, Texas does not have a compulsory pooling or unitization statute.
107
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wide drainage.113 Conservation laws may also require production of oil and gas at
optimal pressures to prevent unnecessary loss of reservoir energy through the
application of oil and gas ratios or maximum efficient rate limitations.114
Conservation law also addresses unnecessary, inefficient, reckless, or
uneconomic waste of resources at the surface. For instance, a number of
conservation statutes prohibit excessive flaring or venting—the burning or release
of natural gas at the surface.115 Economic waste was discouraged through
prohibitions on undesirable uses of natural gas that consume limited resources
without maximizing societies’ economic returns.116 Prohibitions on economic waste
include “complete or partial prohibition of production or consumption,” or
prohibition of the use of petroleum products “in nonefficient processes or inferior
uses.”117 For instance, most state conservation statutes prohibit use of oil in the
manufacture of carbon black, a substance resulting from the incomplete combustion
of hydrocarbons.118 Market waste has also been limited through state conservation
laws. Although rarely used today, state conservation laws have attempted to limit
price instability and premature well abandonment due to production that outpaced

113

See Kramer, supra note 111, at 258.
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3451 (West 2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(b)
(2019); see also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 1, § 5.01[2].
115
225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 732/1-75(d)(4) (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.4
(2019); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3300 (“[T]he blowing, release, or escape of gas into
the air shall be prima facie evidence of unreasonable waste.”).
116
Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258, 263–67 (1937); Walls v. Midland
Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 324–25 (1920).
117
Williams, supra note 7, at 1155–56. Occasionally, these methods have been
implemented. For example, production and fracturing moratoria have been employed in
limited circumstances to stop waste and protect health, safety and the environment, or while
agencies pursue rulemaking efforts. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NTL NO. 2010N04, NOTICE TO LESSEES AND OPERATORS OF FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES IN THE OUTER
CONTINENTAL SHELF REGIONS OF THE GULF OF MEXICO AND THE PACIFIC TO IMPLEMENT
THE DIRECTIVE TO I MPOSE A MORATORIUM ON ALL DRILLING OF DEEPWATER WELLS (2010),
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/news/pressreleases/upload/MORATORIU
M_NTL.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWX7-9X7S]; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 41, Requiring Further
Environmental Review of High-Volume Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus Shale (Dec.
13, 2010), https://govt.westlaw.com/nycrr/Document/Ib2187f04646111e09f330000845b8d
3e?viewType=FullText&originationContext=documenttoc&transitionType=CategoryPageI
tem&contextData=(sc.Default) [https://perma.cc/8RFK-5K89], continued by N.Y. Exec.
Order No. 2, Review, Continuation and Expiration of Prior Executive Orders (Jan. 1, 2011),
http:// www.governor.ny.gov/executiveorder/2 [https://perma.cc/YFY8-8DE3]. Local
governments have also imposed moratoria on drilling and hydraulic fracturing, with limited
success. See Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to
Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 403, 411 (2017).
118
Walls, 254 U.S. at 322. See generally Henderson Co., 300 U.S. 258 (1937)
(discussing whether the prohibition by Texas of the use of sweet natural gas for the
manufacture of carbon black in the Panhandle field is valid).
114
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demand.119 States addressed these market rate challenges by limiting either the
amount that an operator of a well could produce or the lowest price at which oil or
gas could be sold through prorationing,120 common purchase orders requiring ratable
take,121 and minimum wellhead pricing.122
Conservation statutes have survived numerous constitutional challenges, which
argued that regulations to curb waste and protect correlative rights unlawfully
restricted the profitable uses of private property, resulting in a taking of property
without due process of law, denial of equal protection, or impairment of contractual
obligations.123 Contract and property rights are subject to each state’s reasonable
exercise of the police power to prevent waste of natural resources. In a series of
cases, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld conservation statutes based on state police
power interests in preserving natural resources, assuring delivery of oil and gas to
the public, and protecting the correlative rights of owners within the pool.124 As the
Court wrote in Cities Service Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., “[i]t is now
undeniable that a state may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent economic and
physical waste of natural gas.”125

119

Oil and Gas Conservation, supra note 78, at 1142–43.
See, e.g., LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 43, §§ 3501–3511, 3701–3709 (2019); 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §§ 3.45, 3.49 (2019); see also Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n of
Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210, 234–36 (1932); 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER,
TEXAS LAW OF OIL & GAS § 9.3(A) (2d ed. 2018). Prorationing empowers commissions to
restrict production on the basis of market demand in their jurisdiction. MANUAL OF OIL AND
GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 861.
121
1913 Okla. Sess. Laws 439, 440 §§ 2, 3; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52 §§ 29, 239.
Ratable takes are imposed by conservation agencies to limit production so that each
landowner overlying a common reservoir will receive a “fair share” of the oil or gas
produced. MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 886–87.
122
SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 120, § 9.3(A). Wellhead prices are charged at the
mechanical “head” of a natural gas well. MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45,
at 1175. Minimum wellhead prices are fixed by regulation to help royalty owners account
for their financial interest in the well’s production. Id. at 629–30.
123
See Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S. 179, 185 (1950); Barton
Thompson, Jr., Resources Use and the Emerging Law of Takings: A Realistic Appraisal, 42
ROCKY. MTN. MIN. LAW. INST. 2, 2-53 (1996); SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:7.
124
R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 583–84 (1940);
Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, Los Angeles Cty., California, 284 U.S. 8, 22
(1931).
125
Cities Serv. Gas Co, 340 U.S. at 185.
120
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III. THE ROLE OF STATE OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION AGENCIES
A. Statutory Authority and Jurisdiction
State statutes typically delegate regulation of oil and gas production to
conservation agencies.126 In order for a conservation agency to have jurisdiction to
resolve a dispute, issue an order, or grant a permit, a statute must lawfully delegate
that authority to it127 with appropriate standards for delegation.128 Additionally,
conservation statutes must not be preempted by other law.129 Thus, oil and gas
regulatory agencies are both limited and empowered by their statutory delegations
of authority.
Consistent with their delegated “quasi-legislative,” enforcement, and “quasijudicial,” powers, conservation agencies engage in diverse functions, including
rulemaking, entering orders, conducting investigations, finding facts, and applying
sanctions or levying civil penalties.130 This broad authority, combined with specific
mandates and policy directives, has served as the basis for commission regulation of
126
See, e.g., COLO. REV STAT. § 34-60-105 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-6 (2019);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 29 (2019); 58 PA. CONST. STAT. § 405 (2019); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 81.051 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (2019); Patrick H. Martin, The
Jurisdiction of State Oil and Gas Commission, in ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST, 18A OIL AND
GAS CONSERVATION LAW AND PRACTICE 3-1, 3-4–3-5 (1985) [hereinafter Martin, State Oil
and Gas Commission].
127
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–74 (1989); Martin, State Oil and
Gas Commision, supra note 126, at 3-5–3-8.
128
See MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 68 (1956).
129
See, e.g., Millennium Pipeline Co. v. Seggos, 288 F. Supp. 3d 530, 539 (N.D.N.Y.
2017) (“[S]tates are preempted from independently enforcing [Section 401 Clean Water Act
certification] standards through the denial of state permits.”); Islander E. Pipeline Co. v.
McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Clean Water and Coastal Zone
Management Acts are notable in effecting a federal-state partnership to ensure water quality
and coastal management around the country, so that state standards approved by the federal
government become the federal standard for that state.” (citing Islander E. Pipeline Co. v.
Conn. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 482 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2006))); ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp.
Comm’n of Oklahoma (“OCC”), 860 F.2d 1571, 1582 (10th Cir. 1988) (OCC Order No.
281285 asserted that regulation of interstate pipelines was within its jurisdiction based on
the state’s ratable take statute and was necessary to prevent waste and protect correlative
rights); Colo. Mining Ass’n v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Summit Cnty., 199 P.3d 718, 723
(Colo. 2009) (citing State Dep’t of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1004 (Colo. 1994));
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm., 693 P.2d 227, 238 (Wyo. 1985)
(finding “no intent by Congress to exclude states from regulating mining activities on federal
land so as to safeguard environmental values.”); see also Alexandra B. Klass, State
Innovation and Preemption: Lessons from State Climate Change Efforts, 41 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1653, 1673 (2008).
130
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (2019); McGowan v. Mississippi State Oil
& Gas Bd., 604 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss. 1992); see also Martin, State Oil and Gas Commission,
supra note 126, at 3-5.
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the manner, location, and technical aspects of production, as well as the preemption
of conflicting local land use regulations.131 For instance, state oil and gas
conservation agencies derive their authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing from
their respective enabling acts.132
Oil and gas conservation agencies may also be charged with the implementation
of programs unrelated to the conservation of oil. For example, the Wyoming Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission (WOGCC) has jurisdiction over carbon dioxide
sequestration,133 whereas the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) has regulatory and
enforcement responsibilities under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Clean Water Act.134 These additional
delegated duties may require a conservation agency to engage in fact-finding relative
to the extent of drinking water sources, the mechanical integrity of wells, or the
containment capacity of proposed storage reservoirs.135
Conservation agencies may not act outside the areas where they have been
specifically empowered to act, whether that authority remains with the state or has
been delegated to another agency.136 For example, conservation agencies cannot
adjudicate title disputes,137 contract rights,138 tort claims,139 or consider violations of

131

These grants of authority have also cited preemption of local government rules that
conflict with state regulations. See City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d
573, 577 (2016).
132
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 34–60–102(1)(b) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 8211-201 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-2-11 (2019); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 86.082
(2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (2019). Each agency enabling act provides several
general requirements to address oil and gas production, applicable to both conventional and
hydraulically fractured wells. Some relevant provisions common to most acts include
bonding, permitting, well location, waste disposal, and strata sealing. William J. Brady &
James P. Crannell, Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation in the United States: The Laissez-Faire
Approach of the Federal Government and Varying State Regulations, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L.
39, 63 (2012).
133
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-313 (2019).
134
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.131 (2019).
135
Id.; 055-4 WYO. CODE R. § 1 (LexisNexis 2019).
136
See Gage v. R.R. Comm’n of Texas, 582 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. 1979); Larsen v.
Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 569 P.2d 87, 90 (Wyo. 1977); Helmerich & Payne, Inc.
v. Corp. Comm’n of Oklahoma, 532 P.2d 419, 422–23 (Okla. 1975) (citing H.F. Wilcox Oil
& Gas Co. v. State, 19 P.2d 347, 350 (Okla. 1932)); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n of Colorado, 284 P.2d 242, 246–47 (Colo. 1955).
137
See Sun Oil Co. v. R.R Comm’n of Texas, 390 S.W. 2d 803, 806–07 (Tex. App.
1965).
138
Superior Oil Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 241 So.2d 911, 912 (La. 1970);
Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Texas, 395 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App. 1965).
139
Kingwood Oil Co. v. Hall-Jones Oil Corp., 396 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1964); Foree
v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 431 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex. 1968).
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antitrust laws.140 For example, in Kerr-McGee Corp. v. WOGCC,141 the Supreme
Court of Wyoming invalidated the WOGCC’s decision that a new tertiary
production project was not entitled to a 2% severance tax exemption on the basis
that the statute creating the tax exemption included a five-year limitation.142
Although the state conservation agency had the authority to certify tertiary recovery
projects, the court held that the commission had “no authority to base its decision on
tax matters,” finding that it had “invaded an area in which it had no statutory right”
since the state legislature delegated “the construction of any statute affecting the
assessment, levying, and collection of taxes” to the State Board of Equalization.143
Conservation agencies are required to fulfill their delegated duties consistent
with the public purposes as established by their respective enabling statute(s).144
While the preambles and legislative declarations of purpose vary between states,
there are common elements. Declared purposes principally include the prevention
of waste and protection of correlative rights.145 In addition, legislatures may include
other purposes, such as fostering development and ensuring that development does
not pose undue harm to health, safety, or the environment. The following subsections
discuss each of these legislative purposes.
1. Preventing Waste
All state conservation statutes include some form of a prohibition on waste,
though statutory definitions differ.146 Almost all states prohibit physical waste—the
spillage of oil and gas or dissipation of reservoir energy that results in the stranding
of oil and gas underground.147 However, statutory prohibitions on waste may also
include environmental or economic waste.

140

Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 382 S.W.2d
343, 347 (Tex. App. 1964); see also Michael J. Wozniak et al., Horizontal Drilling: Why It’s
Much Better to “Lay Down” Than to “Stand Up” and What Is an “18° Azimuth” Anyway?,
57 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 11.01, 11.10–12 (2011).
141
903 P.2d 537 (Wyo. 1995).
142
Id. at 538.
143
Id. at 544–45.
144
See, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:4(A) (1950); see also Martin, State Oil and Gas
Commission, supra note 126, at 3-5.
145
NEB. REV. STAT. § 57-901 (2019); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 23-0301
(McKinney 2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-01-10 (2019); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 40-6-1 (West
2019); W.VA. CODE § 22C-9-1 (2019); see also Union Pac. Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
882 P.2d 212, 223 (Wyo. 1994); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Colo.
1992); Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 569 P.2d 87, 89–90 (Wyo. 1977).
146
SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:5.
147
See, e.g., TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(a)(6) (2019) (defining waste as
“physical waste or loss incident to or resulting from drilling, equipping, locating, spacing or
operating a well or wells in a manner that reduces or tends to reduce the total ultimate
recovery of oil and gas from any pool”).
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Economic waste prohibitions are designed to prevent drilling which does not
increase recoverable oil in the reservoir. For instance, Utah defines waste more
expansively to include the drilling of unnecessary wells to recover the same
resource, thus resulting in an inefficient allocation of capital, increased costs of
production, higher costs to the consumer, and unnecessary consumption of surface
resources.148 Still, other states regulate oil and gas to prevent “market demand
waste,”149 the abuse of correlative rights,150 or the burning of natural gas for uses
deemed wasteful.151 Even in Texas, which has long acknowledged the “virtues” of
drilling unnecessary wells152 and which does not specifically address economic
waste in its statutes,153 courts have permitted consideration of economic factors in
spacing proceedings.154 In contrast, the Wyoming Legislature expressly excluded
economic waste from its consideration when it rejected language that would have
permitted its commission to consider “the drilling of wells not reasonably necessary
to effect an economic maximum ultimate recovery of oil and gas from a pool.”155
Waste may also include otherwise lawful activities that would result in undue
environmental degradation. For instance, Wyoming’s statute prohibiting the waste
of gas through flaring provides:
it shall be unlawful to allow or permit such natural gas to pollute or
contaminate the atmosphere to such an extent that injury or damage is
sustained by growing crops, vegetation, livestock, wildlife, or domestic
fowls, or to such an extent that the human health, welfare, or safety is in
anywise impaired or damaged.156
This approach expands on Wyoming’s general definition of waste in Section 30-5101 of the Wyoming Statutes,157 and is reminiscent of early state police power
justifications limiting the right of a mineral owner to capture and dispose of its
property.158 Although the Wyoming statute neither defines flaring as waste nor

148

UTAH CODE. ANN. § 40-6-2(27) (West 2019).
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 324.61501–02 (2019).
150
ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-102(15)(C) (2019).
151
See SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:38.
152
See JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS: A
STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 334 (2013).
153
Id. at 270.
154
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Railroad Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 497, 501–02 (Tex. 1978).
155
Larsen, 569 P. 2d at 92–93 (quoting proposed statutory language that was not
ultimately enacted); see also Houston G. Williams & George M. Porter, Practice Before the
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 353, 403–04
(1975).
156
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-121 (2019).
157
Id. § 30-5-101(i).
158
See supra Part II, at notes 87–120.
149
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outright prohibits flaring,159 it affords the conservation agency the authority to
prohibit or limit flaring as waste where it results in environmental degradation or
otherwise imperils the public interest.160 Despite this and similar statutes in other
states, however, agencies have not embraced statutory prohibitions on waste as
authorizing consideration of impacts beyond those immediately impacted by
operations, nor impacts related to climate change.161
Courts, however, may read waste and conservation statutes more expansively.
Waste has been defined by courts as having an “ordinary and generally accepted
meaning and . . . whatever dictates of reason, fairness, and good judgment would
lead a person to conclude is a wasteful practice in the production, storage, or
transportation of oil and gas is included within the term.”162 Although the historical
focus of waste prevention has been to avoid non-production of oil and gas,163 judicial
definitions of waste also provide latitude for commissions to limit or prohibit
exploration activities with unreasonable environmental impacts. A Michigan court
interpreted the Michigan Oil Conservation Act’s prohibition on waste to include
“spoliation or destruction of the land, including flora and fauna.”164 Similarly, courts
have found waste prohibitions in federal statutes to include environmental injuries
other than physical waste. For instance, waste of natural resources, as defined in the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, has been interpreted to include injury to animals
and plants within the marine environment.165 Consistent with American common
law principles of waste and nuisance, which require reasonable use of a resource
with due regard for the rights of others and without injury to the remainder, with
reasonableness determined relative to the locality,166 judicial interpretations of waste
prohibitions in conservation law leave open the possible prohibition of oil and gas
production activities that unreasonably damage the local environment.
2. Protecting Correlative Rights
Oil and gas conservation statutes also task conservation agencies with
protecting the correlative rights of owners within common subsurface accumulation

159

See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-101(a)(i)(G) (2019) (defining “waste” to include
“[t]he flaring of gas from gas wells except that necessary for the drilling, completing or
testing of the well”); see also MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 1, § 5.01.
160
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-121 (2019).
161
See, e.g., Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 2019 CO 17 ¶
31–44, 433 P.3d 22, 30–32 (Colo. 2019).
162
R.R. Comm’n v. Shell Oil Co., 206 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Tex. 1947).
163
See supra Part II.
164
Michigan Oil Co. v. Nat. Res. Comm’n, 276 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Mich. 1979).
165
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Morton, 493 F.2d 141, 145 (9th Cir. 1973) (interpreting 43 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a)(1)(2018)).
166
John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 519, 533–36, 553–56 (1996); SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 2.21.
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of oil and gas or source of supply.167 Concerns regarding waste are concomitant to
the protection of each mineral owner’s correlative rights in the reservoir. Operations
by any owner within the common resources will have an effect on the property
interest and economic opportunity available to others.168 The doctrine of correlative
rights emerged as one of the core justifications for modification of the rule of capture
by legislative action.169 Waste by any owner within a pool or common source of
supply imperils the correlative rights of others within that reservoir community by
limiting the quantity of oil or gas that can be reasonably produced.170 Thus, each
owner must exercise its rights of extraction under the rule of capture with due regard
for the rights of others.171 Correlative rights refer to each mineral owner’s coequal
property interest in the common subsurface resource and the rights and duties that
exist between owners of the common resource.172
Thus, the protection of correlative rights and the prevention of waste are
complementary functions of state conservation agencies. Without statutes
prohibiting and limiting waste, excessive use by one owner would diminish the
property interests of all others. Accordingly, in the absence of voluntary contracts,
regulations that protect and reinforce the correlative rights of mineral owners are
necessary to advance the state’s interest in production.173 Although some courts have
seemingly created a hierarchy that prioritizes the prevention of waste over the
protection of correlative property rights,174 both functions are necessary to ensure
fair and efficient development of oil and gas resources. A disproportionate focus on
the prevention of waste without protections for correlative rights could unreasonably
impair the property interests of some mineral owners, whereas an absolute adherence
to strict principals of proportionality would undermine the production incentive
created by the rule of capture.

167

The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized correlative rights. See Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203 (1900).
168
6 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 4.3 (2000).
169
Kramer & Anderson, supra note 75, at 914–15.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM’N, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS
IN THE UNITED STATES 187 (1964); Eugene Kuntz, Correlative Rights in Oil and Gas, 30
MISS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1958); Lewis M. Andrews, The Correlative Rights Doctrine in the Law of
Oil and Gas, 13 S. CAL. L. REV. 185, 186 (1940).
173
See generally MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 1, § 5.01.
174
See Sw. Kansas Royalty Owners Ass’n v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kansas, 769 P.2d
1, 9 (Kan. 1989); Gilmore v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n of Wyoming, 642 P.2d 773,
779 (Wyo. 1982); Denver Producing & Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma, 184 P.2d 961, 963 (Okla.
1947); Wilson, supra note 97, at 18-7.
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3. Encouraging Efficient Development
The ultimate aim of waste prevention and the protection of correlative rights,
and thus of conservation law more broadly, has been to promote development of oil
and gas. Many state conservation laws provide that the statutory purpose of the
agency is to “promote” or “encourage” efficient development.175 Encouraging the
efficient and orderly development of natural resources is a critical objective of
conservation law, and one that is in direct contrast to many environmental movement
stakeholders, who often advocate maxims such as “keep it in the ground.”176 The
rule of capture, though now constrained by doctrines of nuisance, and limited by
regulations to protect correlative rights and prevent waste, is as relevant today as it
was following the Spindletop discovery.177 Legislatures have not found that oil and
gas production, ipso facto, endangers the public welfare or is wasteful. In fact, in
many states, production of oil and gas and other natural resources is declared to have
a high public value, such that private property is subject to condemnation by
governments, utility companies, and energy developers where it is necessary for
drilling or production.178 For instance, the constitutions of several western states
provide that private property may be taken by oil, gas, and mining companies in
furtherance of the public interest in natural resource development.179 Accordingly,
conservation agencies are required to balance protection of health, safety, and the
environment, prevention of waste, and protection of correlative rights, with statutory
purposes of encouraging and promoting development. Thus, conservation agencies
have not been empowered to prohibit widespread development of mineral property
in response to environmental concerns.180 Accordingly, a conservation agency’s
restrictions on the property and contract rights of mineral owners are limited to the
extent that they can be accomplished without substantially impeding development
or making development wholly impracticable.181

175
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102, 120 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-391
(2017); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 92.001 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 45.1-361.27
(1990); W. VA. CODE § 5B-2H-2 (2011).
176
Monika U. Ehrman, A Call for Energy Realism: When Immanuel Kant Met the Keep
It in the Ground Movement 2019 UTAH L. REV. 435, 438–41.
177
See supra Part II (discussing Spindletop).
178
Alexandra Klass, The Frontier of Eminent Domain, 79 COLO. L. REV. 651, 691
(2008).
179
Id. at 657.
180
The landmark legislation enacted in Colorado in 2019, SB 19-181, changes this
presumption. See discussion infra notes 388–402.
181
See, e.g., Union Pacific Resources Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 882 P.2d 212, 223 (Wyo.
1994).
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4. Health, Safety, Public Welfare and the Environment
A number of states, including Arizona, Alaska, Colorado, and Kentucky,
authorize their respective commissions to consider public safety, health, welfare,
and responsible development in exercising their delegated authority.182 Courts have
long recognized that the rule of capture is not absolute, and capture must be
exercised with due regard for the health and property of others. Therefore, courts
have upheld states’ reasonable exercise of their police power to protect such
interests.183 The earliest laws regulating the production of oil and gas did not limit
production or protect correlative rights, but rather made it unlawful for an operator
to transport nitroglycerine in or near cities or towns,184 or to negligently allow a well
to go wild or ignite.185 Despite these early origins, however, in most cases,
comprehensive conservation statutes were not amended to provide conservation
agencies with authority to enact rules for health, safety, and the environment until
decades after adoption of the original conservation laws. For example, Colorado’s
conservation act was amended in 1994 to provide the commission with the authority
to regulate oil and gas operations “so as to prevent and mitigate significant adverse
environmental impacts on any air, water, soil, or biological resource . . . to the extent
necessary to protect public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the
environment and wildlife resources.”186 Illinois and Oklahoma similarly amended
their conservation laws in 1991 and 2000 respectively to provide their state
conservation agencies with more limited authority to intervene only when there is
an imminent threat to public health or environmental safety.187 As illustrated by a
2019 ruling of the Colorado Supreme Court, the addition of such public interest
mandates may introduce theoretical inconsistencies and present challenging issues
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ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.030(e) (2019); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-515 (2019);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102, 106(2)(d) (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 353.500 (West
2019).
183
Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719–20 (Pa. 1893); Townsend v. State, 47 N.E. 19,
23–24 (Ind. 1897); People’s Gas. Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59, 60–61 (Ind. 1892).
184
1919 Okla. Sess. Laws 347, § 1.
185
Act 105, § 26, 1939 Ark. Acts 219, 244; 1906 La. Acts No. 71, § 3; 1909 Okla. Sess.
Laws ch. 26, Art. 2, § 8.
186
1994 Colo. Sess. Laws. 1980, §6 (previously codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60106(2)(d) (2018)), repealed and replaced by 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws. Ch. 120, S.B. 19-191,
§12 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2.5)(a) (2019)) (“[T]he commission shall
regulate oil and gas operations in a reasonable manner to protect and minimize adverse
impacts to public health, safety, and welfare, the environment, and wildlife resources and
shall protect against adverse environmental impacts on any air, water, soil, or biological
resource resulting from oil and gas operations.”). The scope of the text of COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 34-60-106(2)(d) was litigated in Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433
P.3d 22, 27 (Colo. 2019). See infra notes 201–09 and accompanying text.
187
H.B. 1850, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1991); S.B. 1223, 47th Leg., 2d
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2000).
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of statutory interpretation that become core to evaluations of an agency’s
determination of its own statutory duties.188
Although not within conservation statutes, conservation agencies may also be
subject to state procedural statutes that require consideration of environmental
impacts. A significant number of states have some version of procedural
environmental acts, although they differ in their substantive effects, the threshold
tests for when a full environmental review is needed, and provisions for judicial
review.189 For example, in New York, the State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA),190 has been applied to the decisions of the Bureau of Oil and Gas
Permitting and Management, the state conservation agency which is part of the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation.191 In California, the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)192 applies to decisions of the
Division of Oil, Gas, and Geothermal Resources (DOGGR) and the Montana
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA)193 has been applied to decisions of the Montana
Board of Oil and Gas Conservation.194 CEQA provides that “[i]t is the intent of the
Legislature that all agencies of the state government which regulate activities of
private individuals, corporations, and public agencies which are found to affect the
quality of the environment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration
is given to preventing environmental damage while providing a decent home and
satisfying living environment for every Californian.”195 Like the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),196 state environmental procedure acts require
state agencies to analyze the environmental effects of proposed projects and to
consider options to mitigate or avoid significant impacts.197 Litigants have
challenged the adequacy of these environmental analyses in the context of hydraulic
fracturing and the issuance of well permits.198 Thus, a state environmental procedure
act may impact conservation proceedings by requiring costly and timely preparation
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Martinez, 433 P.3d at 31–32.
Daniel P. Selmi, Themes in the Evolution of the State Environmental Policy Acts,
38 URB. LAW. 949, 951–52 (2006).
190
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101–0117 (McKinney 1975).
191
Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F.Supp.2d 109, 134 (N.D.N.Y. 2011).
192
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189.3 (West 2019).
193
MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (2019).
194
Mont. Wildlife Fed’n v. Mont. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 280 P.3d 877, 886
(Mont. 2012).
195
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 2019).
196
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
197
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003 (West 2019).
198
See, e.g., Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Dep’t of Conservation, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d
517, 522, 528–29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
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of environmental impact reports,199 or by providing additional opportunities for
judicial review.200
At times, the administration of multiple regulatory programs for numerous
public purposes may result in conflicts between fostering development, preventing
environmental or public harms, and assuring each mineral owner’s opportunity to
capture its share of the common reservoir. In these instances, an agency must balance
its expressly delegated environmental protection obligations with the obligation to
promote development of oil and gas, prevent waste, and protect correlative rights.201
As a result, none of these purposes will be perfectly achieved. For instance, despite
clear statutory prohibitions on waste, conservation agencies are not expected to stop
or prevent waste altogether. In fact, because some waste is largely accepted as a
necessary and unavoidable component of development (even in the best of
circumstances, 100% of the oil in place cannot be extracted), only unreasonable
waste is prohibited.202 For example, flaring—the process of combusting gas that is
produced from oil wells that cannot be immediately or profitably captured and
sold203—is undeniably wasteful. However, some flaring is necessary in order to test
and equip wells,204 and the majority of state conservation statutes permit flaring for
199

Kern County Planning and Community Development Department, Notice of
Determination (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.co.kern.ca.us/planning/pdfs/eirs/oil_gas/oil_gas
_NOD_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR7L-V7YB]; see also Butte County Dev. Servs., Master
Fee Schedule (Nov. 28, 2018), http://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/10/Fees/Planning/Plann
ing_Fee_Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H9T-RY53]; see CALI. DEPT. OF FISH &
WILDLIFE, CEQA Envtl. Document Filing Fees https://wildlife.ca.gov/Conservation/CEQA
/Fees [https://perma.cc/HN7J-WTQB] (last visited Jan. 2, 2019) (listing the fee for an
Environmental Impact Report Management Fee paid to CEQA to be $3,271); Sunset Sky
Ranch Pilots Ass’n. v. County of Sacramento, 220 P.3d 905, 910 (Cal. 2009) (describing the
environmental review process for proposed private development projects as “costly” and
“time consuming.”).
200
Judicial review of agency determinations under state environmental procedure acts
“must be guided by standards applicable to administrative proceedings generally.” Jackson
v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 435 (N.Y. 1986) (citing Envtl.
Defense Fund v. Flacke, 96 A.D.2d 862, 862 (N.Y. 1983)); see also Save Tara v. City of
West Hollywood, 194 P.3d 344, 355 (Cal. 2008) (observing that because “an agency may
abuse its discretion under CEQA either by failing to proceed in the manner CEQA provides
or by reaching factual conclusions unsupported by substantial evidence . . . [courts]
determine de novo whether the agency has employed the correct procedures . . . [but] accord
greater deference to the agency’s substantive factual conclusions” (internal citations
omitted)).
201
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 25 (Colo. 2019).
202
While beyond the scope of this paper’s analysis, tort and contract remedies may be
available against lessors who unreasonably permit waste of surface or subsurface resources.
See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (1948).
203
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 401.
204
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-34, FEDERAL OIL AND GAS LEASES
5 (2010).
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limited periods of time to permit operators to case or tube wells.205 Further, capture
of all gas may be inefficient. In situations where the capture of casinghead gas may
be so costly as to make recovery of the oil uneconomic, agencies largely permit
flaring of gas so as not to “waste” the oil by making its production impractical or
economically infeasible.206 Though one could argue that an absolute prohibition on
flaring might be consistent with some states’ enabling legislation, most states have
refrained from imposing “no flare” rules on oil wells.207
Oil and gas conservation statutes do not create a hierarchy between legislative
mandates of preventing waste, protecting correlative rights, or providing for
development without undue risk to health, safety, or the environment. Rather,
conservation agencies must balance these competing, and at times conflicting,
legislative directives. For instance, the Colorado Supreme Court found that
Colorado’s conservation agency must provide for “the responsible, balanced
development, production, and utilization of [] oil and gas recourses” in a manner
that protects private and public rights in production.208 Each decision—ranging from
location variances, well spacing, setbacks, and rulemaking—requires factfinding
and consideration of the agency’s delegated duties and statutory purposes.209 Thus,
the result will be unique—tailored to the specific technical, operational, and
environmental aspects of each location and each agency’s determination of the
appropriate balance required by its enabling legislation. The agency’s process,
interpretations, and resulting decisions, as discussed in the next section, are subject
to judicial review.
B. Judicial Review of Agency Decisions
Agency decisions, including those of oil and gas conservation agencies, are
afforded considerable deference upon judicial review. Under state administrative
procedure acts modeled after the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
Model State Administrative Procedure Act (MSAPA), a reviewing court will not
overturn an agency decision absent some clear error in the agency’s application of

205

See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN § 55-102(a) (2019); 055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. §
39(b)(i)–(ii) (LexisNexis 2019); OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15(e) (2016).
206
Ehrman, supra note 70; see, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-06.6 (2019); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 353.160 (West 2019); 055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. § 39 (LexisNexis 2019);
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 165:10-3-15(b)–(c) (2016); MONT. ADMIN. R. 36.22.1220 (2019).
207
Bret Wells, Please Give Us One More Oil Boom—I Promise Not to Screw It Up this
Time: The Broken Promise of Casinghead Gas Flaring in the Eagle Ford Shale, 9 TEX. J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 319, 325 (2014). There are some examples of successful field-wide
no-flare rules in Texas. For example, a 1934 “no-flare” order imposed by the Texas Railroad
Commission on the Agua Dulce field was upheld. See Clymore Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 13
F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Tex. 1936).
208
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 27 (Colo. 2019).
209
Larsen v. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 569 P.2d 87, 92 (Wyo. 1977).
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law or interpretation of its governing statute.210 Generally, most state administrative
procedure acts provide that a reviewing court may only set aside an agency decision
upon finding one or more of the following: the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or
not in accordance with law; the agency has exceeded the scope of its statutory
authority; the agency decision violates the state or federal constitution or denies a
person constitutional rights; or the agency decision was made upon unlawful
procedure. 211 Courts justify this deference to agency decisions based on legislatures’
delegation of authority and agencies’ substantive expertise.212 Where legislative
delegations are unambiguous, and agency decisions are firmly within an agency’s
expertise, such as the authority of conservation commissions over oil and gas
permitting, a reviewing court begins its analysis with a presumption that the
agency’s action was valid.213 For instance, in Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation
Commission v. Martinez, the Colorado Supreme Court found that its review of an
oil and gas commission’s decision whether or not to engage in rulemaking regarding
well permitting rules was “extremely limited” and “highly deferential” to the
agency’s decision.214
If the legislature has not spoken directly to the question at hand, the deference
afforded to state conservation agencies may vary depending on the state, the
substance of its administrative procedure act, and the challenged agency action.215
210

See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L AWS, REVISED MODEL
STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT (2010), https://my.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/
DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=3ab796d4-9636-d856-48e5-b638021eb
54d&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/6Q8D-7VMH] [hereinafter 2010 MSAPA]. Pursuant
to its own terms, the federal Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to state
administrative agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2018). Thus, a state agency’s obligation
to respond to a petition for rulemaking is governed by each state’s respective administrative
procedure act.
211
See, e.g., Larsen, 569 P.2d at 92–93; UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-4-403 (West 2019).
212
Murray Energy Corp. v. Div. of Mineral Res. Mgmt., 998 N.E.2d 872, 876 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2013) (noting justification for this presumption, that, “[w]e recognize that the
legislature has delegated certain authority to the Commission and that the Commission has
accumulated substantial expertise.”).
213
See, e.g., Larsen, 569 P.2d at 90–91. The seminal U.S. Supreme Court case,
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., articulated the modern standard for
deference federal courts give to agency interpretations of their enabling statutes when
statutory directives are ambiguous. See 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). In states that have followed
the Supreme Court’s analysis in Chevron, courts award strong deference to agency decisions
given that the action is not contrary to the scope or purpose of the agency’s delegated
authority. Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards
and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977,
985 (2008).
214
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 27 (Colo. 2019).
215
A number of states have adopted the Chevron approach to agency deference, or
identical versions of it. See Pappas, supra note 213, at 984 (“A survey of the fifty states’
equivalents to the Chevron doctrine shows an array of different announced standards, ranging
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For instance, in Marbob Energy Corp. v. New Mexico Oil Conservation
Commission, the Supreme Court of New Mexico found that a conservation agency’s
interpretation of its enabling statute regarding authority to issue civil penalties was
not entitled to deference where commissioners were not “trained in matters of
statutory interpretation.”216 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin found that the level of
deference afforded an agency’s statutory interpretation could vary “depend[ing] on
the comparative institutional capabilities and qualifications of the court and the
administrative agency.”217 In Alaska, an agency interpretation of a statute may be
entitled to more deference where it is “longstanding and continuous.”218 Where
agencies are afforded deference in interpretations of oil and gas conservation
statutes,219 it may be challenging to overcome the inertia of entrenched views within
conservation agencies, though perhaps not in courts, that an agency acts ultra vires
when it considers environmental impacts.220 However, advocacy on this front has
resulted in legislative reform of oil and gas conservation laws and presented new
opportunities for environmental constituencies to have their voices heard.
IV. REDEFINING OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION
Conservation agencies, particularly in the Marcellus Shale region221 and in
Colorado, have encountered new and growing pressures to exercise their
rulemaking, adjudicative, and enforcement authorities with greater consideration for
environmental matters. This trend is neither nascent nor unexpected. Following the
Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state’s waste prevention statute as
including damage to natural resources, wildlife, and the environment, Professor
Owen Anderson predicted in 1985 that conservation commissions would play an

from strong deference to an agency interpretation to completely de novo review explicitly
discouraging deference.”).
216
206 P.3d 135, 139 (N.M. 2009).
217
Operton v. Labor and Industry Review Comm’n, 894 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Wis. 2017).
218
City of Valdez v. State, 372 P.3d 240, 247 (Alaska 2016).
219
See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean
Water, 336 S.W.3d. 619, 628, 632–33 (Tex. 2011).
220
See Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, Order No. 1-187 (May 29, 2014),
https://cogcc.state.co.us/orders/orders/1/187.html
[https://perma.cc/V76S-X4DK]
[hereinafter Martinez COGCC Order] (“The Proposed Rule, if adopted, would require the
Commission to prevent new drilling from occurring until it is proven that such operations,
cumulatively, would have no adverse impacts. . . . [S]uch a rule is beyond the Commission’s
limited statutory authority under the Oil and Gas Conservation Act . . . ” (quoting a memo
that “was the primary basis for the Commission’s denial of the Petition”)); see generally
Martin, State Oil and Gas Commission, supra note 126.
221
“Marcellus shale natural gas is that gas which is located in the Marcellus Shale
Formation, which covers 104,067 square miles in Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and New York.” Butler v. Charles Powers Estate, 65 A.3d 885, 886 n.1 (Pa. 2013).
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increasing role in regulating oil and gas activities to protect the environment.222
Since then, social and economic shifts have increased concerns about fossil
development as the economies of many oil-producing states have diversified to
include a greater emphasis on high-tech industries and recreational tourism.223
Meanwhile, land has become more fragmented and densely developed,224 and the
environmental and human health impacts of resource development are more visible
and better understood.225 As a result, public interest has shifted away from the
vitality of the industry and the maximization of development. Instead, as this Part
will show, citizens and environmental groups have pushed for more open and
democratic agency proceedings and increased regulation of the environmental and
social impacts of oil and gas operations.
Responses to heightened public concern have emerged from all areas of
government and have had a profound impact on the regulation of oil and gas
production. Legislatures have amended conservation laws to include statements in
favor of environmental stewardship and proposed legislation to alter the scope of
conservation agency authority.226 Citizens have brought proposals before
conservation agencies and to the ballot box requesting increased setbacks from
occupied dwellings and schools and stronger consideration of climate impacts from
the agencies’ permitting decisions.227 Local governments have emerged as leaders
and are intervening in land use determinations associated with oil and gas for the
protection of health, safety, and environmental interests.228 As a result, oil and gas
222

Owen Anderson, New Directions in Oil and Gas Conservation Law, in ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. INST., 18A OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION LAW AND PRACTICE 14, 14-8 (1985) (citing
Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Commission, 276 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1979)).
Professor Anderson also anticipated increased conflicts over water pollution and local
government regulation. Id.
223
Klass, supra note 129, at 691; Colorado State Energy Profile, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=CO#1 [https://perma.cc/N9SE-E7W4]
(last updated Jan. 17, 2019); Kevin J. Duffy, Regulating Hydraulic Fracturing Through Land
Use: State Preemption Prevails, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 834–37 (2014).
224
Michael E. Kjelland et al., Factors Related to Spatial Patterns of Rural Land
Fragmentation in Texas, 40 ENVTL. MGMT. 237–42 (2007).
225
Steven Cohen, The Growing Level of Environmental Awareness, HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb 28, 2015), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-growing-level-of-envi_b_6390054
[https://perma.cc/SGZ8-7L93].
226
See infra Part V.
227
See infra Sections IV.A. (discussion petitions for rulemaking) and IV.B (discussing
ballot box initiatives).
228
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, When States’ Legislation and Constitutions Collide with
Angry Locals: Shale Oil and Gas Development and Its Many Masters, 41 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 55, 59 nn. 6–7 (2016) (“In 2012 alone, fourteen states enacted or
refined comprehensive oil and gas legislation, which in each state restricted local control to
at least some degree.”); Nathaniel L. Foote, Not in My Backyard: Unconventional Gas
Development and Local Land Use in Pennsylvania and Alberta, Canada, 3 PENN. ST. J. L.
& INT’L AFF. 235, 245 (2015).
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conservation agencies are pressured to exercise their rulemaking authority in new
ways and to increasingly consider environmental impacts when exercising their
permitting authority. Where conservation agencies have refused, a frontier of
litigation has emerged, seeking to clarify commissions’ authority and obligations
with respect to environmental matters.229 The confluence of these cases has birthed
new opportunities for conservation groups and municipalities to influence the oil
and gas permit approval and regulatory process.
A. Before the Agency: Petitions for Rulemaking
Citizen petitions for rulemaking are a primary pathway for members of the
public to gain access to administrative rulemaking proceedings before conservation
agencies. Petitions may force a reluctant agency’s hand on a particular issue. A
“petition for rulemaking,” as the name suggests, is a process by which an interested
person can propose that a federal or state agency promulgate a particular rule.230
Citizen petitions regarding oil and gas are fairly common among federal agencies.231
In contrast, state oil and gas conservation agencies were long viewed as being closed
and dealing only with “seemingly mundane well spacing and related conservation
proceedings.”232 Recently, however, environmental groups have begun petitioning
state conservation agencies to initiate rulemaking on a variety of environmental
subjects.
Citizen petitions for rulemaking are expanding the scope of parties who are
involved in proceedings before the conservation agency. Participation in the
majority of proceedings before an oil and gas conservation agency are limited to
“operators or royalty owners of land,” and parties who have the “right to drill or
produce.”233 Participants may include surface owners, mineral owners, and royalty
owners of “land surface on which oil and gas operations occur,” or parties who own
a property interest in an “affected tract[] of land within the area affected by a drill
permit or well spacing order.”234 Whereas a party within the boundaries of a spacing
229

See infra Section IV.C.
See OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, A GUIDE TO THE RULEMAKING PROCESS (2011),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2011/01/the_rulemaking_process.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/D6K5-ZYGL].
231
See, e.g., Citizen Pet. Requesting the Completion of a Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement, Chesapeake Bay Foundation et al. to U.S. Council on Envtl. Quality Chair
et al. (filed Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.cbf.org/document-library/cbf-misc-documents/FINAL
-Petition-to-CEQ-Apr-4-201176ff.pdf [https://perma.cc/LNH5-Z8GB].
232
Pierce, supra note 5, at 776.
233
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-72-106 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-60108 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-11-144 (2019); 25 PA. CODE § 79.23 (2018); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5-109 (2019) (extending to interested persons the right to be heard on
objections to proposed drilling units).
234
055-0001-1 WYO. CODE R. § 2 (LexisNexis 2019); Allen v. Alaska Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n, 1 P.3d 699 (Alaska 2000).
230
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unit235 can protest an application or challenge a decision, a neighbor who lives near
the proposed drilling location or a group of people who enjoy recreating in the area
might not. For instance, in Wyoming, only parties within one half-mile of the
boundaries of land subject to a permit are entitled to receive notice of complaints or
file protest applications.236 As a result, many citizens with concerns about oil and
gas development in their own region do not have standing to challenge agency
permitting decisions. These individuals and groups are availing themselves of the
petition process to urge oil and gas conservation agencies to protect their interests.
Citizen petitions to initiate rulemaking are rooted within both the federal APA
and most state administrative procedure acts. States that have adopted the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act, or a version of it, generally require “each
agency to give an interested person the right to petition for the issuance, amendment,
or repeal of a rule.”237 Although exact definitions in state administrative procedure
acts differ, most permit an interested person to file a petition for rulemaking.238 An
“interested person” may “include[] any person who may be aggrieved by agency
action.”239 Thus, a broader class of stakeholders are eligible to file petitions for
rulemaking than those who can protest agency decisions regarding the development
of specific parcels. As a result, concerned citizens in some regions of the United
States are using the petition process to ask conservation agencies to initiate new
rulemakings for oil and gas rules.240 The interest of citizens in availing themselves
in the petition process varies significantly from state to state based on state rules
regarding the obligation of agencies to respond and the standard for review of agency
decisions. Indeed, agencies at the state and federal levels receive hundreds of
petitions for rulemaking each year, while others receive none whatsoever.241
Although an agency must consider a petition for rulemaking,242 it has broad
discretion whether to affirmatively respond. The process for submitting a petition
235

A spacing unit is the surface “area allocated to a well under a well spacing order.”
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS, supra note 45, at 1016; see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
236
055-0001-5 WYO. CODE R. § 5 (LexisNexis 2019).
237
See 2010 MSAPA, supra note 210; MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROCEDURE ACT § 6
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1961) (“Any interested person may
petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”); see also
supra note 210 and accompanying text.
238
OR. REV. STAT. § 183.390 (2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-103(1) (2019); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 63G-3-601(2) (West 2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-9 (2019); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 2-4-315 (2019).
239
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-102(6.2) (2019); HAW. REV. STAT. § 91–14 (Supp. 2004);
ALA. CODE § 9-17-15 (2019).
240
See Martinez COGCC Order, supra note 220.
241
JASON A. SCHWARTZ & RICHARD L. REVESZ, PETITIONS FOR RULEMAKING: FINAL
REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 41 (2014),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20Petitions%20for%20Rulemak
ing%20Report%20%5b11-5-14%5d.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EMP-D5NM].
242
Id.
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and the agency’s official procedures, if any, for accepting and responding to
petitions, arise from the state’s administrative procedure act.243 Procedural
requirements may lack transparency and differ significantly between states.244
Although the decision whether to deny or accept the petition is within the discretion
of the agency, generally the agency may not simply ignore the petition and must
issue a response either declining or adopting the proposed rule within a reasonable
time.245 Under the revised 2010 Model State Administrative Procedure Act, the state
agency must either deny the petition with an explanation or initiate rulemaking
within 60 days of receiving the petition.246
Rejection of a petition may constitute a final agency action and thus create
standing for environmental advocates to challenge an agencies’ decision and ask for
judicial clarification of the agency’s duties with respect to the environment.247
Whether the agency’s denial is subject to judicial review may depend on the state
administrative procedure act and the reason for the agency’s denial. For instance,
administrative procedure acts in Colorado and Washington grant aggrieved and
interested parties standing to appeal petition denials, along with other final agency
actions, to the courts for judicial review.248 In Wyoming, conversely, “[t]he action
of the agency in denying a petition is final and not subject to review.”249 An agency’s
refusal to initiate rulemaking in response to a petition is “at the high end of the range

243

See supra notes 237–241 and accompanying text.
Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Public Participation in Nonlegislative
Rulemaking, 61 VILL. L. REV. 759, 761 (2016) (“Even when [judicial] review is available,
the federal courts employ inconsistent standards to evaluate both agency inaction and
unreasonable delay in adjudicating a petition.”). See also ADMIN. CONF. OF THE UNITED
STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECOMMENDATION 2014-6, PETITIONS FOR
RULEMAKING 2 (2014) https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%2520Pet
itions%2520for%2520Rulemaking%2520Recommendation%2520%255B12-9-14%255D.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NVD4-EG93] (noting that few federal agencies have delineated clear
procedures for responding to petitions for rulemaking).
245
See, e.g., Larry Koch, Inc. v. Texas Nat. Conservation Comm’n, 52 S.W.3d 833,
838 (Tex. App. 2001).
246
2010 MSAPA, supra note 210, § 318.
247
See id. § 506 (“[A] person may file a petition for judicial review under this [Act]
only after exhausting all administrative remedies available within the agency the action of
which is being challenged and within any other agency authorized to exercise administrative
review.”).
248
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-106 (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.570(4)) (2019);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702 (2019); The 2010 MSAPA also grants broad standing to
petitioners on judicial review. See 2010 MSAPA, supra note 210, § 501.
249
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-106 (2019) (emphasis added). The Administrative
Procedure Acts of Montana and Texas do not include provisions for judicial review of an
agency decision not to initiate rulemaking. See Texas Comm’n on Environmental Quality v.
Bonser-lain, 438 S.W.3d 887, 893–94 (Tex. App. 2014); Common Cause of Montana v.
Argenbright, 917 P.2d 425, 431 (Mont. 1996).
244
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of levels of deference.”250 That deference, however, does not extend to statutory
construction by the agency.251 An agency’s determinations of law are reviewed de
novo.252 Thus, where an agency refuses to undertake rulemaking on the basis that
doing so would exceed its jurisdiction, even where an agency’s denial of a
rulemaking petition is not reviewable, the agency’s statutory construction is properly
the subject of judicial review.253 The resulting challenges may provide opportunities
for reinterpretation of the agency’s enabling statute, including an evaluation of the
agency’s obligations with respect to environmental protection.
Petitions for rulemaking concerning health and environment in the oil and gas
and other resource development contexts accompanies an emerging trend among
environmental advocates to embolden structural and procedural barriers to
developing natural resources.254 Over the last several years, conservation groups and
concerned citizens have used petition procedures to push conservation agencies to
exercise their rulemaking authority by proposing new rules.255 The rulemaking
proposals urge conservation agencies to increase the consideration of environmental
impacts in oil and gas regulation and to protect surface landowners from the health,
safety, and environmental impacts of drilling and production.256 Petitions brought
before agencies generally fall into one of two categories: petitions for increased
setbacks of drilling locations and petitions for consideration of landscape-scale
environmental impacts. As the subsections below demonstrate, agency
250

Defs. of Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 919 (2008); Rags Over the Arkansas
River, Inc. v. BLM, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1045 (D. Colo. 2015); Squaxin Is. Tribe v.
Washington Dep’t. of Ecology, 312 P.3d 766, 771 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
251
Martinez v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2017 COA 37, ¶ 14, 434
P.3d 689, 692 (Colo. App. 2017), rev’d, 2019 CO 3.
252
Colo. Dept. of Labor and Employment v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189, 193 (Colo. 2001).
253
Simpson v. Cotton Creek Circles, LLC, 181 P.3d 252, 261 (Colo. 2008); N. Laramie
Range Found. v. Converse Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2012 WY 158, ¶ 22–24, 290 P.3d
1063, 1073 (Wyo. 2012).
254
Experiments concerning the potential of administrative agencies to embolden
environmental barriers to development have emerged also in realms like water appropriation,
where citizens and tribes have petitioned state agencies to block new appropriations for the
conservation of instream flows. See Lindsey Schromen-Wawrin, Adopting Instream Flow
Rules in Washington State: Can Citizens Jumpstart the Process Through the Administrative
Procedure Act?, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 561, 574–78 (2013).
255
See, e.g., Other Proceedings in All 50 States, OUR CHILDREN’S TRUST,
https://www.ourchildrenstrust.org/other-proceedings-in-all-50-states [https://perma.cc/QN5
Z-FKF6] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (since 2011, Our Children’s Trust (among other groups)
has submitted petitions for agency rulemaking regarding oil and gas development in all fifty
states).
256
See, e.g., Pet. Kids vs. Global Warming to the Wyo. Dep’t Envt’l Qual. & Wyo.
Envt’l Qual. Control 2–3 (May 4, 2011), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/571d109b04
426270152febe0/t/57858cd1ff7c502ee8544f19/1468370131824/Wyoming+Petition+.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RM5S-N35X] (seeking promulgation of rule to mandate protection of
atmosphere as public trust resource).
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responsiveness to these petitions differ, though both have opened pathways to
additional environmental regulation of oil and gas activities.
1. Increased Setbacks
Citizens have been petitioning oil and gas conservation agencies in a number
of states to initiate rulemaking that would increase setbacks from schools, homes,
and other occupied structures, as well as from environmentally sensitive areas such
as streams and wetlands. Setbacks from drilling locations are a significant area of
concern to surface landowners and conservation groups alike.257 In the absence of
regulation or contract, a mineral developer has no obligation to offset a well location
from a home or residence,258 though there is a strong custom of doing so. While
some states have codified or implied an obligation to accommodate the existing uses
of the surface owner,259 mineral owners’ use of the surface was traditionally
constrained only by the bounds of reasonableness, as determined by custom and
practice in the industry.260 Landowner tolerance for the externalities of drilling and
production has diminished as a result of changing social norms and increased
development in urbanized areas and on split estates.261 In those areas, the surface
owner may have no interest in, or control of, the underlying minerals.262 Thus,
surface landowners in suburban areas, who neither participate in the leasing and
permitting process nor receive the economic benefits of production, are experiencing
the brunt of the negative externalities from development.263 To buffer the most
localized development impacts, citizens and conservation groups have petitioned oil
and gas commissions to adopt new rules increasing well setbacks from occupied
structures, schools, streams, and other public resources.264

257

See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05 (2019); MD. CODE REGS. 26.19.01.09(G)
(2018); see also Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO.
L. REV. 729, 797–98 (2013).
258
See Clarence A. Brimmer, The Rancher’s Subservient Surface Estate, 5 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 49, 54 (1970); Tara Righetti, Contracting for Sustainable Surface
Management, 71 U. OF ARK. L. REV. 367, 375–77 (2018).
259
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-5-401 to -410 (2019); Ernest E. Smith, The
Growing Demand for Oil and Gas and the Potential Impact upon Rural Land, 4 TEX. J. OIL,
GAS, & ENERGY L. 1, 6 (2008).
260
See Harris v. Currie, 176 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1943); Christopher M. Alspach,
Surface Use by the Mineral Owner: How Much Accommodation Is Required Under Current
Oil and Gas Law?, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 89, 91 (2002).
261
See ERNEST E. SMITH, Urbanization and the Surface Development of Mineral Land:
The Conflict Between the Dominant and Servient Estates, in SELECTED WORKS 96, 96 (2013).
262
See Wiseman, supra note 257, at 778–79.
263
See Alex Ritchie, On Local Fracking Bans: Policy and Preemption in New Mexico,
54 NAT. RESOURCES J. 255, 297–98 (2014).
264
See, e.g., Rebuttal Statement of Colo. Envtl. Coal. Coalition et al., COGCC Setback
Rulemaking 2012, No. 1211-RM-04 (Colo. Oil and Gas Conserv. Comm’n Dec. 31, 2012).
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In Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming, conservation agencies initiated
rulemakings for new surface setback and notification requirements after citizen
groups petitioned for more stringent rules.265 Conservation agencies are typically
responsive to the petition process, even if the proposed rule is denied.266 For
example, in 2012, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC)
commenced rulemaking regarding surface setbacks following a proposal from the
Colorado Environmental Coalition.267 The contentious process resulted in the
adoption of Rule 604, which creates a buffer zone setback prohibiting location of a
well within 1,000 feet of certain buildings.268 In order to obtain an exception from
the 1,000-foot setback requirement, oil and gas operators must consult with
landowners and local governments and agree to “site specific mitigation measures
as necessary to eliminate, minimize or mitigate potential adverse impacts to public
health, safety, welfare, the environment, and wildlife.”269 This provision empowers
both surface landowners and local governments, provides opportunities for private
governance approaches to development conditions, and mitigates development
impacts. Similarly, in July 2018, the COGCC voted in favor of a petition brought by
the League of Oil and Gas Impacted Coloradans to alter oil and gas well setbacks
from the property boundaries of schools and daycares and provide new notice and
consultation requirements.270 Subsequent rulemaking proceedings led to the
adoption of a new rule in December 2018.271
Montana and Wyoming similarly adopted new surface protections following
petitions for rulemaking. In 2013, following a petition from the Powder River Basin
Resource Council, the WOGCC commenced rulemaking to modify its occupied

265

See Larry Mayer, Gazette Opinion: Put Some Distance Between Oil Wells and
Montana Homes, BILLINGS GAZETTE (Aug. 6, 2015), https://billingsgazette.com/news/opin
ion/editorial/gazette-opinion/gazette-opinion-put-some-distance-between-oil-wells-andmontana/article_d2358543-81e7-554f-80c9-40c5d3871d3c.html [https://perma.cc/S4XQ8Z7X]; Stephanie Joyce, Draft Rule Proposes Increased Buffer Between Drilling and
Homes, WYO. PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/draft
-rule-proposes-increased-buffer-between-drilling-and-homes#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/K5
DU-8TL3].
266
See, e.g., WYO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL
REASONS FOR AMENDMENT OF RULES (2015), http://wyoleg.gov/arules/2012/rules/ARR14077.pdf [https://perma.cc/LM28-J5KE].
267
Rebuttal Statement of Colo. Envtl. Coal. et al., supra note 264.
268
COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:604.a(2) (2019).
269
Id.
270
Jean Lim, School Setback COGCC Rulemaking Going Forward After Logic Petition,
BROOMFIELD CONCERNED (Jul. 30, 2018), https://broomfieldconcerned.org/blog/authorjean-lim/school-setback-cogcc-rulemaking-going-forward-after-logic-petition/ [https://per
ma.cc/YF4K-Z8RN].
271
COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:305.a(4), 306.h, 604.a(6).
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structure setbacks to require a 500-foot setback from an occupied structure.272
Although the new rules doubled the previous setbacks, they were far lower than the
1,000 feet or more that landowner advocates had requested.273 In Montana, the
Montana Board of Oil and Gas commenced rulemaking on setbacks and occupied
structure notice requirements following action by the Northern Plains Resource
Council.274 The Board ultimately declined to adopt setback rules but implemented
new notice requirements for all occupied structures within 1,320 feet of a proposed
well.275
Setback and notice requirements mitigate the most immediate impacts of
drilling and provide procedural protections to landowners. Landowner advocacy
groups have successfully used the petition process to push conservation agencies to
adopt or expand setback rules. As the examples from Montana, Colorado, and
Wyoming demonstrate, even where petitions are denied, conservation agencies may
respond to citizen petitions by initiating their own rulemaking proceedings, leading
to similar results.
2. Climate and Landscape-Scale Environmental Impacts
Conservation groups and concerned citizens have also pressed commissions to
limit drilling activities by considering cumulative, landscape-scale impacts.276 One
272

055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. § 47(a) (LexisNexis 2019); see Dustin Bleizeffer,
Homeowners Upset at State’s New Oil and Gas Rule, WYOFILE (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.wyofile.com/homeowners-upset-states-new-oil-gas-rule/ [https://perma.cc/6Z
J5-QNKL]; Lynne J. Boomgaarden, Oil and Gas Agreements: Surface Use in the 21st
Century, 11 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN. 11B-1, 11B-5 (2017).
273
See John Robitaille, Robitaille: Increasing Setbacks to 500 Feet Is Reasonable,
CASPER STAR TRIB. (Mar. 29, 2015), https://trib.com/opinion/columns/robitaille-increasingsetbacks-to-feet-is-reasonable/article_f1b5ed29-a063-5e51-b2ad-9c6f76c9a3dc.html
[https://perma.cc/B3XK-472H].
274
See Renée Jean, New Setback Rule Could Face Setbacks of Its Own: MPA President
Says Board Didn’t Have Rulemaking Authority, WILLISTON HERALD (Dec. 26, 2016),
https://www.willistonherald.com/news/new-setback-rule-could-face-setback-of-its-own/art
icle_986042d0-c7e4-11e6-9d51-03b516a8e3c6.html. [https://perma.cc/Q2JR-XPHL].
275
MONT. ADMIN R. 36.22.620(2) (2017). Legislation which would have reduced the
notice requirements adopted by the Montana Board of Oil and Gas were vetoed by the
Governor in 2017. In a statement that confirmed the Board’s authority to enact the rule,
Governor Steve Bullock lauded the “heavily vetted” rulemaking process that resulted in a
“compromise between landowners’ and the industry’s interests.” S.B. 93, 65th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mont. 2017); Letter from Steve Bullock, Governor, to Corey Stapleton, Sec’y of State
(May 8, 2017), https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2017/AmdHtmS/SB0093GovVeto.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/MU8S-XMLJ].
276
Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, Railroad Commission Petitioned to Replace Local
Oil and Gas Rules Threatened by House Bill 40 (Apr. 7, 2015),
https://www.edf.org/media/railroad-commission-petitioned-replace-local-oil-and-gas-rulesthreatened-house-bill-40 [https://perma.cc/57GG-9JP3]; Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund,
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such petition in Colorado has resulted in litigation regarding the obligation of the
COGCC to consider the impact of drilling on public health, safety, and welfare, and
the environment.277 In November 2013, a group of Colorado teens petitioned the
COGCC to initiate rulemaking.278 The proposed rule required the COGCC to refrain
from issuing new oil and gas drilling permits for operations, including hydraulic
fracturing, until the “best available science” confirmed that the drilling would not
“cumulatively, with other actions, impair Colorado’s atmosphere, water, wildlife,
and land resources, . . . adversely impact human health [or] contribute to climate
change.”279 The teens argued that under Colorado’s Oil and Gas Conservation Act,280
the COGCC is tasked with ensuring that development of oil and gas is “responsible
[and] balanced” and that production is “consistent with protection of public health,
safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and wildlife
resources.”281 In May 2014, the COGCC unanimously rejected the teens’ rulemaking
petition.282 The COGCC determined that the proposed rule was beyond its authority
and would require it to “readjust the balance crafted by the General Assembly,” and
that delegating review of COGCC’s rulemaking to a third-party organization would
be an unlawful violation of the non-delegation doctrine.283 The COGCC also found
that many of the issues raised in the petition were already being addressed by the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment and the Legislature and
related more closely to air quality than oil and gas.284
In January of 2019, in Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission v.
Martinez, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the COGCC’s rejection of the
teens’ petition and overturned an appellate court decision that had found for the
petitioners.285 The outcome of the decision is not surprising; courts frequently defer
to an agency’s interpretation of its statutory enabling program and afford an agency
broad discretion in “how best to marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry

EDF Calls for New Safety Measures to Prevent Oil and Gas Explosions in Texas’ Coastal
Area (Jun. 18, 2015), https://www.edf.org/media/edf-calls-new-safety-measures-preventoil-and-gas-explosions-texas-coastal-areas [https://perma.cc/9R2P-PTBD].
277
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 27 (Colo. 2019).
278
See Martinez COGCC Order, supra note 217; see also Blair Miller, Colorado
Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Case Involving Oil and Gas Regulators,
Environmentalists, DENVER CHANNEL (Jan. 29, 2018), https://www.thedenverchannel.com/
news/politics/colorado-supreme-court-to-hear-appeal-of-case-involving-oil-and-gas-regula
tors-environmentalists [https://perma.cc/F74Y-LMUQ].
279
Martinez COGCC Order, supra note 217.
280
COLO. REV. STAT. § (2019).
281
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 28–29 (Colo.
2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2019)).
282
Martinez COGCC Order, supra note 217.
283
Id.
284
Id.
285
Martinez, 433 P.3d at 33.
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out its delegated responsibilities.”286 Although the court declined to read the
Commission’s order as a conclusion that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, it
found that the agency’s decision was reasonable in light of the court’s construction
of Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act.287
The effort of citizens to reform Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act through the petition
process is significant for two reasons. First, it provided citizens with an opportunity
to argue for a statutory reinterpretation of the Act.288 This allowed for judicial review
of the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act and for the petitioners to argue for
a more expansive reading of its environmental protection provisions in the Colorado
Oil and Gas Act. Second, the case drew significant attention from citizens and
grassroots organizers and established the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation
Commission as a target for environmental advocacy. Within five years of the initial
petition filed with the Commission in Martinez, Colorado would see a flurry of antiindustry ballot initiatives and a comprehensive legislative reform of the Colorado
Oil and Gas Act.289
B. At the Ballot Box
Advocates have advanced ballot initiatives to revise the authority of
conservation agencies, impose new duties on states to protect the environment, or
directly regulate oil and gas activities. In November 2018, voters across the western
United States had the opportunity to vote on ballot initiatives relative to energy and
the environment290: Washington voters considered a carbon tax;291 Arizona292 and

286

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Rags Over the Arkansas River,
Inc. v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 77 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1045 (D. Colo. 2015). But see Mobil
Oil Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 608 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Kan. 1980); Martin, State Oil and
Gas Commission, supra note 126, at 3–10.
287
Martinez, 433 P.3d at 32.
288
See id. at 24–25.
289
See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
290
David Roberts, Fossil Fuel Money Crushed Clean Energy Ballot Initiatives Across
the Country, VOX (Nov. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/11
/7/18069940/election-results-2018-energy-carbon-fracking-ballot-initiatives [https://perma.
cc/E5WQ-GDVK].
291
Washington Carbon Emissions Fee and Revenue Allocation, Wash. Initiative No.
1631 (Wash. 2018); see Washington Initiative 1631, Carbon Emissions Fee Measure (2018),
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Initiative_1631,_Carbon_Emissions_
Fee_Measure_(2018) [https://perma.cc/6T8U-HMQP] (last visited March 6, 2020).
292
Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona Act, Proposition 127 (Ariz. 2018); see Arizona
Proposition 127, Renewable Energy Standards Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Proposition_127,_Renewable_Energy_Standards_Initiative
_(2018) [https://perma.cc/H5PZ-DM9W] (last visited March 6, 2020).
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Nevada293 voters evaluated renewable energy mandates; and voters in Montana
considered restrictions on hard rock mining.294 In states with the power of initiative
or referendum, voters have sought to bypass legislatures and agencies by advancing
new laws that dictate what kind of energy will be used and produced, how to address
climate change and carbon taxes, and where energy production can occur. The
“democratization of energy law” through voter initiatives and referenda is
underway,295 and oil and gas has been no exception.
Environmental advocates have used the ballot initiative and proposition
processes to ask voters to restrict oil and gas development in environmentally
sensitive areas or areas where public safety or health are of greater concern. In
Alaska, voters rejected a proposition which would have had serious impacts on oil
and gas construction activities—the proposition would have charged the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game commissioner with enacting standards and permitting
requirements for activities that affect salmon and other anadromous fish habitats.296
In contrast, Florida voters passed an amendment banning offshore drilling in state
waters.297 In Colorado, voters put forth a ballot initiative that would have increased
setbacks beyond those established by the COGCC to 2,500-foot setback from
occupied structures.298 Like a similar measure proposed in November of 2016, had
the setback initiative passed, over 90% of the land in some counties would have been
unavailable to future oil and gas development.299 Although the setback initiative was

293

The Energy Choice Initiative, State Question No. 3 (Nev. 2018); The Renewable
Energy Promotion Initiative, State Question No. 6 (Nev. 2018); see NEV. SEC. OF STATE,
STATEWIDE BALLOT QUESTIONS TO APPEAR ON THE NOVEMBER 6, 2018 GENERAL ELECTION
BALLOT 23–31, 64–72 (2018), https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/home/showdocument?id=5824
[https://perma.cc/LUD8-5CT5].
294
An Act Requiring the Department of Environmental Quality to Deny a Permit for
Any New Hardrock Mines in Montana Unless the Reclamation Plan Provides Clear and
Convincing Evidence that the Mine Will Not Require Perpetual Treatment of Water Polluted
by Acid Mine Drainage or Other Contaminants, Ballot Initiative No. I-186, (2018),
https://sosmt.gov/elections/ballot_issues/2018-2/ [https://perma.cc/3LJJ-E6HJ].
295
Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 581, 598–600
(2018).
296
An Act Providing for the Protection of Wild Salmon and Fish and Wildlife Habitat,
Initiative Pet. No. 17FSH2 (Alaska 2018), http://www.elections.alaska.gov/Core/initiative
petitionlist.php#17FSH2 [https://perma.cc/HF62-S6MZ]; see Alaska Ballot Measure 1,
Salmon Habitat Protections and Permits Initiative (2018), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Ballot_Measure_1,_Salmon_Habitat_Protections_and_Perm
its_Initiative_(2018) [https://perma.cc/SWT2-2ZQS] (last visited March 6, 2020).
297
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (2018).
298
Results for Proposed Initiative #97: Ballot Title Setting Board 2017–2018, COLO.
SECRETARY OF ST. JENA GRISWOLD, https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives
/titleBoard/results/2017-2018/97Results.html [https://perma.cc/YS7B-VEBQ].
299
COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION, 2500’ MANDATORY SETBACK
FROM OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT 2 (2016), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/library/
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defeated after a contentious election season, the Colorado Legislature shortly
thereafter revised its oil and gas conservation laws to provide counties with greater
authority to establish setbacks and take other actions relative to the regulation of oil
and gas.300
Of the several oil and gas-related initiatives on the ballot nationwide in
November 2018, only Florida’s ban on offshore drilling in state waters passed. This
trend may indicate that, at least in the realm of energy, the initiative process is driven
more by “wealthy individuals and special interests” than distrust of the legislature
or regulatory agencies.301 Despite this observation, voters looking to direct
democracy to regulate oil and gas production activities should not be ignored.302
Perhaps most significantly, legislatures, agencies, and judges are responsive to
initiatives.303 As a result, in states where they are authorized, voter initiatives are
eclipsing legislatures as powerful forces in driving public policy. Even failed
initiatives can have powerful indirect impacts on state policy. In states with initiative
processes, “the threat of an initiative can cause the legislature to revise its policy
decisions.”304
C. In the Courts
Conservation agencies are also facing pressure from courts to place greater
importance on environmental impacts when making decisions. Courts play an
important role in independently shaping the development of conservation law and
Technical/Miscellaneous/Init_78_Proposed_2500ft_Setback_Assessment_Report_2016052
7.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM8L-EKCD]. Another Initiative, Amendment 74, proposed by
industry would have required compensation to mineral and property owners for diminution
in value as a result of land use regulation. It was also defeated. See Colorado Amendment 74,
Compensation to Owners for Decreased Property Value Due to State Regulation Initiative,
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Amendment_74,_Compensation_to_Own
ers_for_Decreased_Property_Value_Due_to_State_Regulation_Initiative_(2018) [https://
perma.cc/TQT9-PR97] (last visited Jan. 5, 2019).
300
Greg Avery, Voters Reject Oil Well Setbacks as Colorado’s Proposition 112
Defeated, DENV. BUS. J. (Nov. 6, 2018, 8:30 PM MST), https://www.bizjournals.com/denver
/news/2018/11/06/colorado-prop-112-defeated.html [https://perma.cc/TAD2-HU8L]; see
infra notes 396–409 and accompanying text.
301
DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
POWER OF MONEY 243 (1st ed. 2000).
302
Vann R. Newkirk II, American Voters Are Turning to Direct Democracy, THE
ATLANTIC (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/citizenballot-initiatives-2018-elections/558098/ [https://perma.cc/TY9W-2PMP].
303
See John G. Matsusaka, Popular Control of Public Policy: A Quantitative Approach,
5 Q. J. POL. SCI. 133, 136 (2010) (“provid[ing] direct evidence on how direct democracy
affects congruence, finding that policies are approximately 18 to 19 percent more congruent
in initiative than noninitiative states.”).
304
John G. Matsusaka, The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st
Century, 124 PUB. CHOICE 157, 161, 174 (2005).

726

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 3

determining to what extent agencies can and must consider environmental impacts
in agency decisions.305 Courts frequently review conservation agency decisions and
resolve conflicts between mineral owners, surface interests, local governments, and
conservation advocates.306 These decisions may concern issues of statutory
interpretation, preemption, standing, and agency procedures.307 Recent decisions in
Pennsylvania and Ohio indicate a trend towards affording greater deference to
environmental concerns.308 These decisions have affirmed the standing of
individuals, municipalities, and advocacy groups to challenge agency decisions that
do not adequately consider or protect environmental values.309
Landowners are increasingly objecting to proposed agency actions due to
concerns regarding health, safety, and the environment. Courts have upheld
regulatory and common law limitations on oil and gas development to protect public
safety since the earliest days of development. For example, in People’s Gas Co. v.
Tyner, the Indiana Supreme Court granted a preliminary injunction to an adjacent
landowner to prevent an operator from shooting a well with nitroglycerine because
the use of explosives in a residential area might constitute a nuisance.310 Despite
these long-held concerns, conservation agencies have been disinclined to deny
drilling permits based on landowner or community groups’ objections to the
disruption and loss of enjoyment of property that industrial development can render,
instead encouraging landowners to pursue common law tort remedies.311 Dissenting
landowners are beginning to raise these concerns in administrative processes and
appeal to courts for judicial review where those concerns are ignored. The resulting
case law has affirmed an agency’s authority—and, at times, obligation—to consider
these and other non-economic factors as a progressively important component of
permitting decisions.312
In one Ohio case, Simmers v. City of North Royalton, health and safety concerns
featured prominently in a commission decision relative to statutory pooling.313
Statutory pooling provides the commission with authority to order a combination of
305

Mitchell, supra note 78, at, 402.
Id.
307
Id.; Phillip Wm. Lear, Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Law and Practice, 1998
UTAH L. REV. 89, 98, 123, 136–37; SAINT-PAUL, supra note 2, § 4:16.
308
See, e.g., Simmers v. City of North Royalton, 65 N.E.3d 257, 263–64 (Ohio Ct. App.
2016); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017).
309
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901, 920, 931–33, 939
(Pa. 2013).
310
People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 31 N.E. 59 (Ind. 1892).
311
See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Get Out from Under My Land! Hydraulic Fracturing,
Forced Pooling or Unitization, and the Role of the Dissenting Landowner, 30 GEO. ENVTL.
L. REV. 633, 675–88 (2018) [hereinafter Robertson, Get Out from Under My Land!];
Christopher S. Kulander, Common Law Aspects of Shale Oil and Gas Development, 49
IDAHO L. REV. 367, 373–77 (2013).
312
See Robertson, supra note 228, at 105–09 (discussing Simmers, 65 N.E.3d 257, and
its progeny supporting the consideration of non-economic issues in permitting decisions).
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Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at 263–64.
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mineral interests where necessary to conform to spacing regulations.314 In Simmers,
the operator sought to involuntarily pool two tracts owned by the City of North
Royalton after the city unanimously voted to deny a proposed lease to an operator.315
The City objected to the application of forced pooling on the basis of the operator’s
poor safety record.316 In December 2013, the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources’ Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management issued the drilling
permit and mandatory pooling order.317 The Division found that pooling was
necessary to meet the state’s spacing requirements and that an offer had been made
to voluntarily pool on a just and equitable basis.318 On appeal, however, the Ohio
Oil and Gas Commission revoked the mandatory pooling order because the Division
had not adequately considered the owner’s legitimate safety concerns.319 The Ohio
Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission’s decision.320 The court held that the
Division should have considered other factors, including the city’s health, safety,
and infrastructure concerns, as part of its evaluation of whether an offer for voluntary
pooling was just and equitable in light of the impact of oil and gas operations on the
nonconsenting landowner.321 Among other concerns, the court considered “the
negative impact of drilling activity on streets and other infrastructure, or the safety
of a municipal water supply.”322 The Court agreed that the oil and gas operator had
not used all reasonable efforts to reach an agreement for voluntary pooling because
it had not provided the dissenting landowner, the city, with a sufficient opportunity
to consider the offer and propose a reasonable alternative.323
Simmers is notable for the significance it places on the dissenting landowner’s
surface-based concerns.324 While much of the case focuses on whether Cutter used
“all reasonable efforts” to obtain a voluntary agreement, it also looks at whether the
agreement Cutter proposed was reasonable.325 Rather than focusing its analysis
solely on whether the city’s allocation of production was fair and equitable based on
the amount of oil and gas estimated to be under its property, the Ohio Court of
314

OIL AND GAS LAW, supra note 50, § 905.2.
Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at 259.
316
Id. The Ohio DNR has separate authority to condition and deny permits based on
safety concerns during the permitting process. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1509.06(F);
1509.06(H)(1) (West 2019).
317
Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at 259. Interestingly, there is no discussion of OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1509.06 (West 2019) which grants the chief authority to deny “a permit if the chief
finds that there is a substantial risk that the operation will result in violations of this chapter
or rules adopted under it that will present an imminent danger to public health or safety or
damage to the environment.”
318
Simmers, 65 N.E.3d at 258–59.
319
Id. at 259–60.
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Id. at 260.
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Id. at 263.
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Appeals took a more expansive and nuanced view by considering the mineral
owner’s safety-based concerns as part and parcel of the value of its correlative
rights.326 Dissenting landowners’ objections to involuntary combination of their
interests are complex and involve both subsurface and surface concerns.327
Conservation agencies may face increasing pressure to consider these concerns in
both the pooling and permitting processes. Simmers is consistent with observations
that courts may be less likely to defer to agency decisions when agencies disregard
surface and environmental concerns, and more likely to broadly interpret a
commission’s statutory authority to consider health, safety, and the environment.328
Simmers is also significant for its acknowledgment of the unique interest of the
city as a landowner in preventing safety or other environmental harms from coming
to bear.329 Conflicts between state and local governments, conservation agencies,
and legislatures regarding the regulation of oil and gas date back to at least the 1930s,
when the Oklahoma Supreme Court found that a municipality was not preempted by
the State’s establishment of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission from
establishing bonding for wells drilled within the city.330 Cases regarding the
authority of cities to establish drilling blocks or impose conditions on development
have reached disparate results. Courts sometimes invalidate city actions,331 at other
times uphold them,332 and occasionally attempt to harmonize the two.333 Courts have
consistently emphasized the important role of local governments’ use of traditional
zoning authority to regulate land use to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
citizens and the interests of communities in which oil and gas development occurs.334
Yet, local governments are sometimes preempted by either state or federal law from
comprehensively regulating oil and gas, banning drilling, or prohibiting hydraulic
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Id. at 263.
A group of homeowners recently asked the U.S. District Court for the District of
Colorado to overturn the state’s forced pooling law and enjoin the application of the statute
to their interests on the basis of threats to health, safety, and the environment. See Complaint
for Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction at 19, ¶ 121, Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm.
v. Colorado et al., No. 1:19-cv-00190-RBJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46744 (D. Colo. Mar.
18, 2020). The case, however, was dismissed. Wildgrass Oil & Gas Comm., 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46744, at *38–39.
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Martin, State Oil and Gas Commission, supra note 126.
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Robertson, Get Out from Under My Land!, supra note 311, at 669.
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Martin, State Oil and Gas Commission, supra note 126, at 3-27 (citing Gant v.
Oklahoma City, 6 P. 2d 1065 (Okla. 1931), aff’d, 289 U.S. 98 (1933)).
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Id. at 3-28 (citing Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Larkins, 31 P.2d 608
(Okla. 1934)).
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Id. at 3-29, 3-31 (citing Unger v. State, 629 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App. 1982);
Klepak v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 177 S.W.2d 215 (Tex. App. 1944)).
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84CV109 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 25, 1985)).
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fracturing within county or municipal limits.335 Delegations of authority to local
government are overlapping and might interfere or conflict with state delegations of
authority to conservation agencies.336 As a result, cities and counties have found
themselves limited from regulating much of the oil and gas development within their
domains.337 That limitation may be somewhat counterbalanced, however, if courts
follow the holding in Simmers that cities and counties have a right to raise
environmental concerns as landowners in proceedings before state conservation
agencies. The impact of such a holding is important because cities and counties often
own significant amounts of land, including the minerals below schools, parks, roads,
and within greenbelts.338
Courts may also evaluate the impact of conservation agency decisions on
environmental rights that are protected in state constitutions and statutes.
Pennsylvania courts, for example, recognize environmental advocates’ standing to
challenge statutes and agency decisions relative to oil and gas on the basis of
Pennsylvania’s constitutional Environmental Rights Amendment.339 Municipalities
and environmental groups have argued that state actions with respect to oil and gas
on state lands violate citizens’ constitutionally protected rights to a clean
environment and abrogate states’ duties with respect to public trust resources.340
Although public trust arguments have failed in other jurisdictions,341 Pennsylvania’s
Environmental Rights Amendment provides Pennsylvanians with an avenue to
enforce citizen rights to a clean environment.
In the early 1970s, during the birth of the environmental law movement,
Pennsylvania voters amended the state constitution to provide additional protections
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See, e.g., City of Fort Collins v. Colorado Oil, 369 P.3d 586 (Colo. 2016); City of
Longmont v. Colo. Oil & Gas Ass’n, 369 P.3d 573, 577 (Colo. 2016); Robertson, supra note
228, at 111–12; Ritchie, supra note 263, at 257–58; Benjamin L. McCready, Note, Like It or
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Fracking Context, 9 DREXEL L. REV. ONLINE 61, 75–78 (2016); Bruce M. Kramer, Local
Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations: Don’t All Homeowners Want a Pumpjack in Their
Backyard, 41 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. 213, 215–18 (2004). Local governments have
more authority over some types of oil and gas regulation in Colorado pursuant to SB 19-181.
See infra notes 393–411.
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2019).
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(Pa. 2017).
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for the environment and natural resources. Article 1, Section 27 of Pennsylvania’s
Constitution provides:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and the preservation of
the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.342
This provision incorporates a modern version of the public trust doctrine into
the Pennsylvania Constitution, granting citizens an “inalienable” right to a clean
environment.343 As such, it operates as a powerful limitation on state actions that
“would infringe upon such rights”344 and permits legal challenges on the basis that
“the government has failed in its trustee obligations.”345 While not intended to be
read in absolutist terms so as to prohibit development, the Environmental Rights
Amendment requires policymakers to consider conflicting environmental and social
concerns.346 While this provision had been viewed as a merely “aspirational”
statement,347 litigants in Pennsylvania have recently rejuvenated the Environmental
Rights Amendment.348
The Environmental Rights Amendment experienced a renaissance following
the successful challenge of a 2012 state law that attempted to expressly preempt all
local regulation of oil and gas. Pennsylvania, like many states,349 sought to clarify
the division of authority between conservation agencies and municipalities and
preempt local regulation of oil and gas operations with the passage of Act 13 of 2012
(Act 13).350 Act 13 was designed to promote uniformity of regulation across the
state, including the imposition of uniform setback and zoning requirements, by
342
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Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State
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A.2d 468, 473 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975).
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(1973).
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Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 273 (Pa. 1976); Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
347
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 940 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
348
See Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016), aff’d, 158 A.3d 642 (Pa.
2017).
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OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 137.1 (2016); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 81.0523 (West
2019); see also Riverstone-Newell, supra note 117, at 405–08.
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replacing the state’s 1984 Oil and Gas Act with a new statutory framework.351 In so
doing, the Pennsylvania Legislature “attempted to entirely foreclose the ability of
municipalities to afford their residents environmental protections, via the enactment
of any zoning ordinances tailored to address unique local environmental needs and
conditions, whenever those ordinances ‘might be perceived as affecting oil and gas
operations.’”352 In March 2012, municipalities and individuals challenged the
constitutionality of Act 13, claiming that it violated the Environmental Rights
Amendment of the Pennsylvania Constitution.353 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth (Robinson II) affirmed the standing of a
municipality in a legal action to enforce environmental standards and overturned
several provisions of Act 13 on the basis that they violated Section 27 of
Pennsylvania’s Constitution.354
Subsequent litigation regarding the Environmental Rights Amendment has
affirmed Pennsylvania’s public trust duties regarding protection of the environment
and the disposition of public natural resources. In Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth (PEDF), the Commonwealth Court found
that the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources’ (DCNR)
decision to lease state property within the public trust implicated “constitutional
rights and duties” and was an “appropriate subject of judicial scrutiny.”355 On appeal,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the minerals under state parks and
forests were “part of the corpus of Pennsylvania’s environmental public trust.”356
The Court enforced the duty of the State to protect the environment and serve as a
trustee, rather than as a proprietor, of its “public natural resources.”357 Although
PEDF did not bar leasing development of oil on state land, it required that royalties
generated from production be committed to “furthering the purposes, rights, and
protections” of the Environmental Rights Amendment.358
Following PEDF, the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) has considered the
extent of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection’s trustee
351
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barred enforcement of some of the Act 13 regulations relative to unconventional gas
operations. See Marcellus Shale Coal. v. PADEP, 185 A.3d 985 (Pa. 2018).
353
PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; see Robinson II, 83 A.3d at 915–16.
354
See Robinson II, 83 A.3d at 999–1000.
355
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 171 (Pa. 2015).
356
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 916 (Pa. 2017).
357
Id. at 934–35.
358
Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 214 A.3d 748, 754 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2019). The court found that the obligation to “conserve and maintain” royalties produced
from the corpus of the public trust did not apply to bonus and rental payments. Id. at 268–
69, 274.
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obligations with respect to public natural resources. Thus far, it has not operated as
a prohibition on development. In a recent case involving permit renewals, the EHB
stated, “[o]ur understanding of the trustee responsibility does not require the
Department to deny permits to any and all activity that will negatively impact the
public natural resources and/or the people who use those resources,” and “[t]o hold
otherwise would essentially prevent any permitting activity since it is nigh
impossible to have development without some environmental impact.”359 Consistent
with the early balancing test articulated in Payne v. Kassab,360 the Board found that
it must assess whether the agency considered the environmental effects of its
permitting actions and correctly concluded that those actions would not
unreasonably degrade the environment.361
The extent of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s constitutional obligation
to protect environmental values in decisions related to private land has been more
limited.362 In PEDF, the DCNR acted relative to state-owned land, part of the public
trust created by Section 27 of Pennsylvania’s Constitution; thus, the Environmental
Rights Amendment was found to be self-executing as to the Commonwealth’s
trustee obligations.363 The amendment’s first clause, creating an individual right to
a clean environment, creates no similar obligation on a government authority to
“conserve and maintain.”364 Based on several early cases, the individual rights clause
359

See Del. Riverkeeper Network, Re. EHB Docket No. 2014-142-B (Pa. Envtl.
Hearing Bd. May 11, 2018).
360
Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. 1973) (“The court’s role must be
to test the decision under review by a threefold standard: (1) Was there compliance with all
applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s public
natural resources? (2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the
environmental incursion to a minimum? (3) Does the environmental harm which will result
from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived
therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion”), aff’d 361 A.2d 263, 273
(Pa. 1976). But see Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth (Robinson II), 83 A.3d 901, 966–67
(Pa. 2013) (clarifying that the Payne test is only appropriate when applied to agency failures
to comply with Section 27-based statutory standards); Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v.
Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911, 940 (Pa. 2017) (Baer, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
361
See Del. Riverkeeper, EHB Docket No. 2014-142-B, at 59.
362
See Commonwealth v. Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588, 594
(Pa. 1973). The Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) has begun to consider
how the ERA applies to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP)
decisions on private lands. See Center for Coalfield Justice v. DEP, 2017 EHB 799 (Pa.
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Aug. 15, 2017), pet. for appeal denied, EHB No. 2018-028-R (Pa. Envtl.
Hearing Bd. Apr. 24, 2018); Friends of Lackawanna v. PADEP, EHB Docket No. 2015-063L (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Nov. 8, 2017).
363
See Robinson II, 83 A.3d at 955.
364
John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects
the Environment: Part 1, An Interpretive Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 DICK. L.
REV. 693, 700–701 (1999).
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of the amendment has long been viewed as requiring implementing legislation to
authorize the state to enforce the people’s rights against owners of private
property.365 Thus, agencies have not substantially changed their permitting or
factfinding processes in response to Robinson II or PEDF. However, the decisions
in Robinson and PEDF have emboldened individuals and municipalities to challenge
oil and gas and other industrial permitting activities and created a pathway by which
these groups can challenge agency actions in which they were previously not
considered interested parties.366 While constitutional arguments thus far have not
resulted in widespread reversals, cases brought to date concerning Section 27 of
Pennsylvania’s Constitution indicate the effects that constitutional environmental
rights provisions367 may have on state conservation agencies.
Many states recognize their citizens’ rights to a clean environment and
acknowledge public trust principles either through state statute, the constitution, or
common law.368 For example, Article 9, Section 1 of the 1974 Montana Constitution
provides that “[t]he state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and
healthful environment” and “[t]he legislature shall provide adequate remedies for
the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and
provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of
natural resources.”369 This provision is not merely an aspirational statement; rather,
it creates an inalienable right to a clean environment.370 The Texas Constitution
similarly declares the “conservation and development of natural resources,” and the
forests and coastal and inland waters of the states to be public right.371 The Texas
Legislature cited this provision as the purpose behind its enactment of a mineral
subdivision act and delegation of its administration to the railroad commission.372
365

John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45
ENVTL. L. 463, 474–75 (2015).
366
Gorsline v. Bd. of Supervisors of Fairfield Twp., 186 A.3d 375 (Pa. 2018); Delaware
Riverkeeper Network v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 179 A.3d 670 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018);
Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 196 A.3d 677, 680 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2018); Clean Air Council v. Sunoco Pipeline L.P., 185 A.3d 478 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2018).
367
In the absence of constitutional provisions creating a public trust, attempts to expand
a common law public trust to oil and gas permitting decisions have been unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22 (2019).
368
LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Alexandra B. Klass, Fracking and the Public Trust Doctrine:
A Response to Spence, 93 TEX. L. REV. 47, 59 (2015).
369
MONT. CONST. art. 9, § 1.
370
Montana Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Sciences v. Green, 739 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont.
1987); State v. Bernhard, 568 P.2d 136, 138 (Mont. 1977); Illinois, Florida, and Virginia
have similar provisions. See Tammy Wyatt Shaw, Comment, The Doctrine of Self-Execution
and the Environmental Provisions of the Montana State Constitution: “They Mean
Something,” 15 PUB. LAND L. REV. 219, 231–32 (1994).
371
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
372
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 92.001 (West 2019) (“It is the further finding of this
legislature that it is necessary to exercise the authority of the legislature pursuant to Article
XVI, Section 59, of the Constitution of the State of Texas to assure proper and orderly
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And courts have used it to support the state’s police power to conserve and develop
its natural resources.373
Environmental rights statutes in Michigan and Minnesota expressly grant any
“private party, state, or local government the right to sue for declaratory or injunctive
relief to protect air, water, land or other natural resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.”374 The Minnesota environmental rights statute has been
used to protect natural resources beyond what is already mandated by state law and
to enjoin development activities that would adversely impact protected natural
resources.375 As such, environmental rights statutes and constitutional protections
may form the basis for additional fact-finding and environmental protection
obligations on state oil and gas conservation agencies, and may prove significant in
determining the outcome of state-local conflicts regarding oil and gas
development.376
The impacts of advocacy efforts through judicial, regulatory, and democratic
means should not be dismissed or diminished. True, these efforts have not resulted
in a sea change at oil and gas conservation agencies. Only one ballot initiative passed
(Florida’s Constitutional Amendment 9), and it related only to areas that had already
been statutorily off limits to drilling as a result of a temporary moratorium.377 Courts
continue to extend a high standard of deference to conservation agency decisions
regarding permits and rulemaking. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the
COGCC’s decision not to initiate rulemaking and, thus far, the Pennsylvania
Environmental Rights Amendment and state environmental procedure acts have not
resulted in blanket reversals of permitting decisions on private land. Collectively,
however, the concerns of landowners, environmental advocates, and municipalities
regarding environmental externalities of drilling have risen to the forefront of oil
and gas development conversations. At times, environmental concerns are eclipsing
historically prioritized prevention of subsurface waste. In response, governors and
state legislatures are identifying and pursuing opportunities to increase the
environmental regulatory function of oil and gas conservation agencies.

development of both the mineral and land resources of this state and that the enactment of
this chapter will protect the rights and welfare of the citizens of this state.”).
373
SWEPI LP v. R.R. Comm’n of Texas, 314 S.W.3d 253, 261–62 (Tex. App. 2010);
Endeavor Energy Res., L.P., v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586, 595 (Tex. 2018).
374
Klass, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 343, at 433–34 (citing MINN. STAT. §
116B.01 (2014)).
375
Id.; Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 721–22 (2006).
376
See Klass, Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 343, at 433–34.
377
FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (2018); Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006, 43
U.S.C. § 1331 (2018).
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V. CONSERVATION REIMAGINED: AMENDING AGENCY AUTHORITY
Elected politicians have considerable power to influence the political
responsiveness of oil and gas conservation agencies through actual or proposed
changes to the agency’s enabling legislation or through executive requests for
rulemaking and the choice of political appointees. Oil and gas conservation agencies
are not structurally independent.378 Governors frequently serve on their states’ oil
and gas conservation commissions and may appoint some or all of the members. 379
For instance, in Colorado, the governor appoints and can remove nearly all of the
members of oil and gas regulatory agencies, subject to confirmation by the state
senate, and members can be removed by the governor at any time.380 As a result,
commissioners may be chosen not only for their technical competence and ability to
make “dispassionate professional judgments” about reservoir characteristics but also
for their political judgment.381 This dependence may account for the responsiveness
that conservation agencies show to political directives.
Although many agencies are permitted to act independently despite executive
instruction,382 oil and gas conservation agencies have recently undertaken
rulemaking on matters relating to health and the environment after receiving
instruction from state governors. For instance, in 2013, Wyoming Governor Matt
Mead directed the WOGCC to initiate rulemaking proceedings for the adoption of a
baseline water quality testing rule in areas of oil and gas drilling to establish a dataset
of groundwater conditions in areas of active drilling.383 In Colorado, the COGCC
has, at times, received heavy-handed instruction from its gubernatorial offices as
well. In 2014, Governor Hickenlooper convened an oil and gas development task
force to improve local government involvement in permitting and other Commission
378

Paul Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DUKE L.J.
257, 265–66 (describing the characteristics of independent agencies).
379
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104 (2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103
(2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-17-02 (2019). In Texas, Commissioners on the Texas
Railroad Commission are elected. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001, 81.01003–
81.01004 (West 2019).
380
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104 (2019).
381
Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599, 612 (2010).
382
See Cynthia H. Coffman, Atty. Gen., State of Colo., to John W. Hickenlooper,
Governor, State of Colo. (May 18, 2017), https://mediaassets.thedenverchannel.com/docu
ment/2017/05/18/051817%20Letter%20to%20Governor_59832999_ver1.0.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/S3SQ-PRMZ] (in response to request by Governor Hickenlooper for abandonment of
appeal of Martinez v. COGCC, Attorney General Cynthia Coffman wrote, “[Governor
Hickenlooper’s] request conflicts with an official decision of the Commission, which [he
does] not have authority to countermand”).
383
OFFICE OF GOVERNOR MATT MEAD, Strategic Initiatives, in WYOMING’S ACTION
PLAN FOR ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY 46 (2013), https://www.naseo.org/Data/
Sites/1/documents/stateenergyplans/WY-Energy_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AEG-MK
MC] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020).
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decisions.384 Following the 2017 explosion of underground flowlines in a Firestone,
Colorado neighborhood,385 Governor Hickenlooper further directed the COGCC to
conduct a comprehensive review of oil and gas regulations statewide.386 While these
policy changes are largely lauded as increasing environmental protection by states,
there is also a risk that the executive branch may wield its position to dissuade
conservation agencies from taking certain actions. As a result, legislative
amendments to agency authority provide for more regulatory certainty and
consistency.
Legislatures are accustomed and well-positioned to respond to environmental
concerns related to oil and gas development. Legislatures are required to make
difficult decisions regarding the balance between strong—and often divisive—
interests when considering the efficient development of oil and gas resources,
protection of the environment, and impacts to surface owners. These decisions
require consideration of both positive and negative impacts of oil and gas
development on the economy, including jobs, education, and public services, and on
the quality of life of their constituents. Redefining waste to include environmental
harms or impacts to climate, for example, could have significant impacts on
established property interests and contracts. These considerations are most
appropriately addressed by legislatures, rather than courts, agencies, or special
interest groups. Together with reasonable local regulation of traditional land use
concerns and enforcement of existing environmental laws, legislatures can provide
for the efficient and responsible development of oil and gas in light of the changing
technologies, development methodologies, and impacts to the environment.
Pressures to increase consideration of environmental and climate impacts have
not gone unnoticed by legislatures. Advocates for more radical changes to
conservation regulation have petitioned lawmakers or introduced legislation to
require conservation regulators to prioritize consideration of environmental impacts
384

Governor John Hickenlooper, Exec. Order B 2014 005, Creating the Task Force on
State and Local Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations (Sept. 8, 2014),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cAwiamfolLM5dZrU7xHnGVrBOJtH80Gh/view [https://
perma.cc/8C54-KRC7].
385
See Bruce Finley, Deadly Firestone Explosion Caused by Odorless Gas Leaking
from Cut Gas Flow Pipeline, DENVER POST (May 2, 2017), https://www.denverpost.com/20
17/05/02/firestone-explosion-cause-cut-gas-line/ [https://perma.cc/J7PY-KWWT].
386
See Gov. Hickenlooper Directs Review of Statewide Oil and Gas Operations
Following Firestone Home Explosion Investigation, ADAMS COUNTY COLO., NEWS (May 2,
2017), http://www.adcogov.org/news/gov-hickenlooper-directs-review-statewide-oil-andgas-operations-following-firestone-home [https://perma.cc/UV7M-QQV2]; Grace Hood, A
Year After the Deadly Firestone Explosion, Neighbors’ Emotions Are Mixed, COLO. PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.cpr.org/news/story/a-year-after-the-deadly-firestonehome-explosion-emotions-are-mixed [https://perma.cc/GU8G-NZB9]; COGCC, Flowline
Rulemaking, Docket No. 171200767 (adopted Feb. 13, 2018), https://cogcc.state.co.us/docu
ments/reg/Rules/FlowlineRulemaking/Flowline_Adopted%20Rules%202_13_18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UD6N-2TMH].
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while diminishing the influence of industry voices.387 In response to local
government action, citizen initiatives, conservation agency decisions and
rulemakings, and litigation, state legislatures in California, Colorado, and
Pennsylvania considered and, in some cases enacted, new laws to clarify agency
authority or address specific environmental issues.388 These actions include
proposals to amend agency authority or the composition of commissions to include
experts on air quality and climate, and modify state oil and gas conservation acts to
harmonize with the changing economy and value systems of citizens. States found
these changes necessary due to the changing scope and impact of oil and gas
development in more densely populated areas. Such legislative amendments have
been instrumental in providing commissions with authority and procedures
regarding environmental issues and the protection of public resources.389 Statutory
and constitutional changes recognizing environmental externalities were precisely
what provided environmental constituencies with statutory bases to argue for greater
consideration of environmental impacts in Simmers, Martinez, and PDEF.
Colorado provides an illustrative case study on the evolution of oil and gas
conservation law. The Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Act was first passed in
1951 to establish the COGCC, to “defin[e] and prohibit[] the waste of oil and gas in
Colorado,”390 and “to provide for the responsible development of the state’s oil and
gas resources,”391 with an emphasis on increased production.392 Shortly thereafter,
the Act was amended to declare that the policy goal of the conservation law was to
“foster, encourage and promote the development, production and utilization of the
natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado.”393 The purposes of the Act
gradually shifted toward an increased focus on environmental, health, and safety
concerns. The Act was amended three more times in 1985, 1994, and 2007, each
387

Jim Malewitz, “Why Are You So Angry at the Railroad Commission?” Texas
Lawmaker Asks Reviewers, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 22, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://www.texastribune
.org/2016/08/22/texas-lawmakers-push-back-railroad-commission/ [https://perma.cc/W3G9
-QTSH].
388
See, e.g., H.R. 18-1071, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2018); Property
Assessed Clean Energy Program: wildfire improvements, S.B. 465, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Cal., as amended by Assembly, July 13, 2017); Assemb. B. 1057, Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2019).
389
See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(c) (2012), invalidated by Robinson II, 83 A.3d
901 (Pa. 2013). These regulations have proved burdensome for developers of conventional
wells. Accordingly, in 2018, the legislature sought to further revise its oil and gas act to roll
back the impact of shale drilling standards on conventional wells. See H.B 2154, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018).
390
Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v. Martinez, 433 P.3d 22, 30 (Colo. 2019)
(citing Ch. 230, 1951 Colo. Sess. Laws 651, 651).
391
Chase v. Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 284 P.3d 161, 165–66 (Colo.
App. 2012) (footnote omitted).
392
Id. at 166.
393
Martinez, 433 P.3d at 30 (citing sec. 10, §§ 100-6-22, 1955 Colo. Sess. Laws 648,
657).
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relative to the protection of health, safety, public welfare, and the environment.394
As a result, today the Act gives the COGCC the authority to regulate oil and gas
operations “so as to prevent and mitigate significant adverse environmental impacts
on any air, water, soil, or biological resource . . . to the extent necessary to protect
public health, safety, and welfare, including protection of the environment and
wildlife resources.”395
Adoption of broad policy positions supporting public health, safety, and
welfare have been critical to providing conservation agencies with authority to
promulgate rules for the regulation of hydraulic fracturing, to require setbacks from
occupied structures, and to respond quickly to new safety concerns including
flowlines and idle and abandoned wells. However, they have not radically shifted
the role of oil and gas conservation commissions away from promoting and
encouraging the efficient regulation of oil and gas operations or a redefining of waste
according to twenty-first century environmental norms. For example, in Martinez v.
COGCC, the Supreme Court of Colorado found that Colorado’s amendments to its
oil and gas conservation act evidenced an intent “to prevent and mitigate significant
adverse environmental impacts . . . but only after taking into consideration costeffectiveness and technical feasibility.”396 Contrary to the petitioner’s arguments,
the court found that the amendments do not create “a check on oil and gas
development,” “a balancing test,” or condition “further oil and gas development on
a finding of no cumulative adverse impacts to public health or the environment.”397
In response to Martinez and the failure of Proposition 112, the Colorado
Legislature enacted SB 19-181 in April 2019.398 The law comprehensively amended
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act to “[p]rioritize[] the protection of public safety, health,
welfare, and the environment in the regulation the oil and gas industry” and
“establish[] local governments’ regulatory authority over the surface impacts of oil

394

Id. (citing ch. 272, sec. 1, § 34-60-106(10)-(11), 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1129, 1129;
ch. 317, sec. 2, § 34-60-102(1), 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 1978, 1978; 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws
1357, 1357; ch. 317, sec. 2, § 34-60-102(1), 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws, 1978, 1978 (amending
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)); ch. 320, sec. 2, § 34-60-102(1), 2007 Colo. Sess. Laws
1357, 1357 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)).
395
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-106(2)(d) (2013) repealed by Oil and Gas—Air
Pollution, sec. 12, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 502, 513–517. Colorado is not entirely unique in
this approach. Illinois and Oklahoma provide their conservation agencies with more limited
authority to intervene only when there is an imminent threat to public health or
environmental safety. Illinois and Oklahoma provide their conservation agencies with more
limited authority to intervene only when there is an imminent threat to public health or
environmental safety. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52 § 139(D)(1) (2019); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT.
725/19.1 (2019).
396
Martinez, 433 P.3d at 31.
397
Id. at 30.
398
See S.B. 19-181: Protect Public Welfare Oil And Gas Operations, COLO. GEN.
ASSEMB., https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb19-181 [https://perma.cc/C2QN-NBGR] (last
visited January 15, 2020) (providing a summary of S.B. 19-181).
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and gas development.”399 SB 19-181 represents the most significant change to state
conservation law since the IOGCC. It drastically alters the function and makeup of
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, directs the agency to
promulgate emissions control regulations, and rebalances authority between state
and local interests.
SB 19-181 shifts the focus of Colorado’s Oil and Gas Act from preventing
waste to regulating the industry for protection of the environment.400 It
fundamentally changes the purpose of the Oil and Gas Conservation Commission
from one that fosters oil and gas development to one that regulates it.401 SB 19-181
also changes the definition of waste in Colorado. Whereas preventing waste has
historically meant assuring that the minimum amount of oil and gas is left in the
ground, SB 19-181 specifically amends the definition of waste so that waste “does
not include the nonproduction of [oil or gas] from a formation if necessary to protect
public health, safety, and welfare, the environment, or wildlife resources as
determined by the commission.”402 Rather than requiring environmental protection
to the extent “reasonably practicable,” the commission must now protect the
environment to the extent as is “necessary and reasonable.”403 Changes in legislative
delegations of authority may direct the commission to prioritize environmental
protection, even when waste of underground resources results.
SB 19-181 also rebalances regulatory authority between the state conservation
agency and local governments. Local governments have mostly been preempted
from comprehensively regulating the majority of oil and gas development activities
or production techniques beyond the exercise of traditional zoning authority.404 SB
19-181 modifies Colorado’s preemption law and longstanding precedent holding
that the Oil and Gas Conservation Agency had primary siting authority for oil and
gas operations. Specifically, the bill grants local governments the explicit power to
regulate the surface impacts of oil and gas operations in a manner that “protect[s]
and minimizes adverse impacts to public health, safety, and welfare and the
environment.”405 This power to regulate oil and gas at a local level extends to land
use, siting of facilities, impacts to public facilities, water quality, noise, vibrations,
light, dust and air quality, reclamation, and other nuisance-type effects.406 It also
grants local governments authority to inspect locations, impose fines, and require
insurance or other financial guarantees or indemnification. Granting local
399

Id.
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-104(1)(h)(VI)(i) (2019).
401
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102(1)(a)(I) (2019).
402
S.B. 19-181, Oil and Gas—Air Pollution, ch. 120, sec. 7, §§ 34-60-103(11), (12)
2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 502, 506–08; COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(11)(b), (12)(b) (2019).
403
COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-103(5.5) (2019).
404
See Natalie Spiess, A Cause Worth Fighting For: The Battle for Local Control over
Colorado’s Oil and Gas Industry, 95 DENV. L. REV. ONLINE 71, 74–76 (2018).
405
Oil and Gas – Air Pollution, 2019 Colo. Legis. Serv. Ch. 120, sec. 4, §§ 1, 1(g)-(h),
1(i), 2–3 (West); COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-104 (2019).
406
COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-20-104 (2019).
400
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governments this much control over the oil and gas industry has sparked fears that
entire counties may outlaw or effectively outlaw oil and gas production through
stringent regulations.407 In fact, since SB 19-181 was signed into law, at least seven
communities have imposed moratoriums on oil and gas development.408 Adams
County, the first jurisdiction to adopt new surface regulations following SB 19-181’s
passage, has tightened its oil and gas rules.409 This authority could create tension
between counties that seek to attract and counties that seek to prohibit oil and gas
development as an unpopular industry.410 The new role of local governments could
also diminish the importance of the commission and undermine the state interest in
uniform regulation of oil and gas.
SB 19-181 changes the composition of the commission to reduce the focus and
impact of the oil and gas industry and to add commissioners with environmental
expertise—most notably by reducing the number of commissioners with substantial
experience in oil and gas from three to one.411 The bill mandates that no member of
the commission can have an existing conflict of interest with the industry, including
those “registered as lobbyists at the state or local level, serving in the general
assembly within the prior three years, or serving in an official capacity with an entity
that educates or advocates for or against oil and gas activity.”412 Finally, the bill

407

Sherrie Peif, Weld County Commissioner: Oil and Gas Bill Could Bankrupt
Colorado, COMPLETE COLO., (Mar. 21, 2019), https://pagetwo.completecolorado.com/2019
/03/21/weld-county-commissioner-oil-and-gas-bill-could-bankrupt-colorado/ [https://perma
.cc/R5NK-XD28].
408
Trevor Reid, 7th Colorado Community Approves Moratorium on New Oil and Gas
Development, GREELEY TRIBUNE, (May 29, 2019), https://www.greeleytribune.com/news/
7th-colorado-community-approves-moratorium-on-new-oil-and-gas-development/ [https://
perma.cc/9NCH-353Z] (listing Erie, Superior, Lafayette, Berthoud, Timnath, Broomfield,
and Adams County as the communities that implemented moratoriums as of May 2019). See,
e.g., CITY OF BROOMFIELD, COLO., ORDINANCE NO. 2091 (2019); see also David Spence,
The Political Economy of Local Vetoes, 93 TEX. L. REV. 351, 374–75 (2014) (analyzing
moratoria in other jurisdictions).
409
ADAMS COUNTY, COLO., DEV. STANDARDS AND REGULATIONS, ch. 2, § 2-02-14
(2019); John Aguilar, Adams County Tightens Oil and Gas Rules, First to do so Since
Colorado Senate Bill 181 Passed, THE DENVER POST (Sep. 3, 2019),
https://www.denverpost.com/2019/09/03/oil-gas-adams-county-colorado/ [https://perma.cc/
XWD8-DJKR].
410
See, e.g., Temporary Restraining Order at 7, Extraction Oil and Gas v. City and
County of Broomfield, Case No. 2020-cv-30106 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Broomfield Cty. Filed Mar.
27, 2020) (enjoining the City and County of Broomfield from issuing any directive ordering
oil company to halt or suspend operations during COVID-19 outbreak).
411
S.B. 19-181, Oil and Gas—Air Pollution, ch. 120, § 8, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 502,
508–09 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 34-60-104(1), (2)(a)(I)–(II) (2019)).
412
S.B. 19-181, § 9, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws at 509–10 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §
34-60-104.3 (2019)) (reducing the number of commissioners from nine to seven).

2020]

THE INCIDENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY

741

requires the appointment of commissioners with formal training or substantial
experience related to wildlife protection, soil conservation, and public health.413
Colorado’s SB 19-181 provides a new model of oil and gas regulation wherein
environmental protection is the principal aim of conservation regulation, rather than
an incidental effect. Based on its expanded authority, in 2019 the COGCC initiated
rulemaking to implement statutory provisions requiring operators to undergo an
alternative location analysis for oil and gas locations and facilities, evaluate
cumulative impacts of development, and assure that the COGCC is regulating in a
manner that achieves the amended legislative purposes.414 Meanwhile, the state and
counties are still working out how to achieve a new balance between state and local
governance of oil and gas development.415
Colorado is not alone in its reconsideration of its oil and gas conservation
framework. On October 12, 2019, California followed the example of SB 19-181
and enacted Assembly Bill 1057 (AB 1057).416 AB 1057 makes substantive changes
to California’s conservation agency. Notably, the law added a provision providing
that “the purposes of this division include protecting public health and safety and
environmental quality, including reduction and mitigation of greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the development of hydrocarbon and geothermal
resources in a manner that meets the energy needs of the state.”417 AB 1057 also
required consultation with other agencies, “in furtherance of the goals of the
California Global Warming Solutions Act.”418 Although California’s law does not
address local preemption or reconstitute the agency, it shifts the focus of California’s
oil and gas conservation agency toward environmental protection and away from
promoting development.

413

S.B. 19-181, § 8 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-104(2)(a)(I) (2019)).
COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC OPERATOR GUIDANCE SB 19181: DIRECTOR’S OBJECTIVE CRITERIA (2019), https://cogcc.state.co.us/documents/reg/SB_
19_181/SB_19_181_Guidance_20190419.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJQ3-5ZZ8].
415
See, e.g., COLO. OIL AND GAS COMM’N. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR
COORDINATION OF CERTAIN PROCEDURES BETWEEN WELD COUNTY’S 1041 WOGLA
PERMITTING AND THE COLORADO OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION COMMISSION’S DSU
APPROVAL AND FORMS 2 AND 2A PERMITTING PROCESS (2019), https://longmontobserver.
org/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Weld-MOU-9.3.2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L2WK7DG8].
416
Cal. Assembly Bill No. 1057, 2019 Cal. Stat. 93 (amending CAL. CIV. CODE § 848,
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8589.7, 8670.55, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 42710, 11042,
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 607, 690, 3002, 3114, 3201, 3202, 3236.5, 3705, 6212, 25550,
30262, 30404, 3011, 3205.3, 3263, CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 309, 714, CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 10783,13267.5).
417
Id. § 9 (codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3011(a) (West 2019)).
418
Id. § 9 (codified at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 3011(b) (West 2019)).
414
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A. Conflicts, Capture, and Capability
Although conservation agencies are alluring targets given their role in
permitting, efforts to task them with widespread protection of the environment and
legislatively repurpose them as environmental regulatory agencies may be
problematic. The purposes of conservation and environmental protection may
conflict. Choosing between inapposite ends would require agencies to exercise
discretion and engage in non-technical public policy more appropriately reserved by
the legislature. Second, oil and gas conservation agencies are vulnerable to capture
by the regulated industry and thus may be less effective than separate environmental
agencies or statutes imposing universal environmental procedure requirements.419
Third, conservation agencies, as traditionally constituted, lack the technical
expertise to make fact-findings that environmental mandates could require. As a
result, pushing oil and gas conservation agencies into an environmental regulatory
role may not result in the landscape- and climate-scale changes that advocates desire.
Each of these three issues is discussed in turn below.
Environmental protection may conflict with the stated purposes of oil and gas
conservation statutes. Oil and gas conservation agencies are tasked with promoting
the efficient development of hydrocarbon resources for the purpose of maximizing
the total amount of production and protecting the rights of other mineral owners in
the field.420 Although these purposes have expanded to include protection of
groundwater and management of oil and gas wastes, typically a secondary state
agency, such as the department of environmental quality, has primacy over state
programs to regulate air or water.421 This segregation is logical. The Clean Water
Act, for example, was enacted “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”422 Those purposes may, at times, conflict
with the purposes underpinning conservation law, thus requiring a reconciliation of
opposites. Although asking agencies to advance conflicting policy choices and find
a “win-win” solution is appealing, policy choices between development and the
environment will frequently create winners and losers.423 Environmental law, by its
very nature, imposes costs and benefits on various stakeholders.424 In contrast to the
concept of co-equal and correlative rights, which seeks to protect each owner’s rights
to produce his just and equitable share of the resource, environmental law “is
purposely and necessarily redistributive in a manner antagonistic to some private

419

Agency capture refers to the scenario where an agency becomes more responsive to
the priorities of its regulated industry than to its public purposes. See infra at notes 428–438.
420
See supra Section III.A.
421
Hannah Wiseman, Fracturing Regulation Applied, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
361, 369–70 (2012).
422
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2018).
423
Alison Peck, Sustainable Development and the Reconciliation of Opposites, 57 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 151, 158 (2012).
424
Id.
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property interests.”425 Thus, a conservation agency’s role of protecting each owner’s
rights to produce its just and equitable share may be incompatible with the protection
of environmental interests in air and water. As advocates increasingly argue that
environmental interests should include aesthetics, the atmosphere, and a stable
climate,426 these potential conflicts may increase.
Agencies have high value when it comes to making the complex technical
determinations necessary to the administration of current oil and gas conservation
law, but should not be involved in more subjective determinations, such as the
comparative public values in oil and gas production and the environment. If
conservation agencies were required to choose between these public purposes and
making fact-findings related to whether the protection of those resources is either
reasonable or necessary, the current permitting processes could become
overwhelmed with a flood of challenges that would, in turn, increase litigation over
agency decisions.427 The resulting litigation would eventually push political
questions regarding the appropriate balance between production and protection
before courts.
Conflicting legislative mandates also increase the danger of agency capture.428
Regulatory agencies may be disproportionately influenced by the industries they are
supposed to be regulating, such that they become more responsive to the desires of
industry than the public.429 Capture can result due to heavy involvement of the
affected industries in the development of regulations,430 partisan appointments, and
the likelihood that, given the expertise required to make technical determinations
within the industry, agency officials may have previously worked in industry and
likely plan on returning to those jobs.431 Consolidating environmental regulatory
functions within oil and gas conservation agencies may amplify the effects of

425

Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705, 725 (1997).
See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp.3d 1224, 1244, 1248–50 (D. Or.
2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020); Dist. Of Columbia v. Air Florida
Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.D.C. 1984).
427
Already land and mineral owners in Colorado have challenged the authority of the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission to pool property interests on the basis SB
19-181 favors the property owners’ rights not to be forced to associate and contribute their
property towards oil and gas development. See Response Brief for Plaintiff at 12, Wildgrass
Oil & Gas Comm. v. Colorado, No. 1:19-cv-00190-RBJ, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46744 (D.
Colo. Mar. 18, 2020).
428
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 50 (2010).
429
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1669, 1685 (1975).
430
For example, the IOGCC and American Exploration and Production Council were
influential in crafting the proposal to exempt hydraulic fracturing from the Safe Drinking
Water Act. See, Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 107, 140 (2015).
431
Barkow, supra note 428, at 47–48.
426
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industry influence in ways that requiring coordination between separate regulatory
and conservation agencies would not.432
Until recently, concerns of agency capture were rarely raised with respect to oil
and gas conservation commissions. The statutory public purposes for which
conservation commissions have historically regulated the industry are not in direct
opposition to industry interests, and in fact facilitate contracting and information
flow among property owners in common reservoirs. As a result, for the most part,
the industry supports reasonable regulation to encourage efficient production,
protect correlative rights, and limit drainage.433 However, as conservation agencies
have taken on responsibility for safety and environmental inspections and regulation
of hydraulic fracturing, concerns relative to undue industry influence have
heightened.434 Environmental laws have significant impacts on oil and gas
development and private property rights that may be in direct conflict with industry
interests. Agency capture has been cited among the contributors to the EPA’s
determination that further study of hydraulic fracturing was unwarranted,435 and the
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.436 In fact, agency capture was
among the principal reasons that, following the Deepwater Horizon spill, the
Mineral Management Service was reorganized into three separate agencies—one
responsible for managing revenue, one responsible for energy development and
leasing, and one responsible for making inspections and assuring compliance.437
Charging conservation agencies with environmental regulation of the industry risks

432

Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of MultipleGoal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
433
Pierce, supra note 5, at 775.
434
Matthew McFeeley, Falling Through the Cracks: Public Information and the
Patchwork of Hydraulic Fracturing Disclosure Laws, 38 VT. L. REV. 849, 854 (2014).
435
Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and
Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 180
(2009). But see David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 123 (2000) (suggesting that concerns of agency capture may be
overstated).
436
See Peter Jan Honigsberg, Conflict of Interest that Led to the Gulf Oil Disaster, 41
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10414, 10414–15 (2011); Hari M. Osofsky,
Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV.
1077, 1100, (2011).
437
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three
Conflicting Missions: Establishes Independent Agency to Police Offshore Energy
Operations (May 19, 2010), https://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-DividesMMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions [https://perma.cc/PZV9-QNZP]; The Reorganization of
the Former MMS, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., https://www.boem.gov/Reorganizat
ion/ [https://perma.cc/C8T5-AQZ4] (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
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creating the exact situation advocates have been working to undo in offshore energy
regulation.438
The majority of oil and gas conservation agencies also lack the technical
capability and expertise to make the necessary findings of fact that environmental
mandates would require. One of the chief benefits of legislative delegation to
agencies is that agencies can develop the highly specialized expertise necessary to
complete the fact-finding to make decisions regarding drilling and permitting in the
public interest. Oil and gas conservation commissions are usually staffed with
experts in law, geology, engineering, and land.439 These disciplines are chosen based
on the ability of specialists within them to make determinations relative to the
prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights. However, the technical and
economic specialties suited to conservation regulation may not provide the requisite
expertise to make findings regarding wildlife or cumulative impacts, such as those
related to climate change.440 In the absence of structural and legal changes, such as
those required by SB 19-181, conservation agencies may not have the authority,
procedures, or expertise necessary to gather information and monitor mitigation for
landscape-scale impacts. A fundamental reordering of conservation agencies to
increase technical expertise on environmental matters may conversely diminish the
agency’s technical capacity and expertise to make the findings necessary to prevent
geologic waste and protect correlative rights.
Legislative reconsideration of the scope and purpose of oil and gas conservation
agencies is necessary and appropriate given changing land use patterns,
development technologies, and social preferences. However, comprehensive
overhaul of oil and gas conservation law to require agencies to serve as both
environmental and conservation regulators may be problematic. In addition to the
potential for conflicts, capture, and capability issues, general environmental and
climate regulation by conservation agencies may be ineffective in achieving the
widespread goals that advocates desire. Conservation agency authority will be
inherently limited to a subset of one very narrow scope of activities and only as to
operations which require agency action. New agency rules regarding setbacks and
permitting do not apply retrospectively to producing wells, which may produce for
decades without requiring any new action in response to revised agency rules.441
438

Jacob D. Unger, Note, Regulating the Arctic Gold Rush: Recommended Regulatory
Reforms to Protect Alaska’s Arctic Environment from Offshore Oil Drilling Pollution, 31
ALASKA L. REV. 263, 277, (2014).
439
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-103 (2019).
440
Proposed legislation in California has sought to amend the composition of the
DOGGR to include equal representation by industry and by experts in air quality, water
quality, and environmental justice, with additional membership by other research scientists.
See S.B. 465, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended by Assembly, July 13, 2017).
441
As a general proposition, a regulation is presumed to apply prospectively unless the
enacting body expressed an intent for it to apply retroactively. See In re Estate of DeWitt, 54
P.3d 849, 854 (Colo. 2002) (reviewing general prohibition on retroactive application of laws
in Colorado). For instance, wells permitted under prior rules requiring a minimum 500-foot
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Thus, a significant portion of the oil patch could largely be unaffected by new agency
rules and regulations. Accordingly, legislative amendments to conservation
authority may be less effective than generally applicable state environmental
procedure laws or environmental rights laws.442 Instead, legislatures should consider
opportunities to enhance the traditional environmental protection functions of
conservation regulation by encouraging landscape-scale resource planning and
private governance.
VI. AN INTENTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY
Oil and gas conservation agencies have always played an inadvertent role in
limiting the environmental impacts of oil and gas production.443 The drilling of
unnecessary wells needlessly destroys surface resources.444 Each well pad requires
clearing of brush and grading, development of roads and drilling pits, and may
include wastewater impoundment, trenching for flow lines, and construction of
production facilities.445 Well sites can range from two to twenty hectares of “nonhabitat,” with impacts on ecosystems that extend beyond the drill site itself.446
Facilities can contribute to erosion, introduce noxious weeds, and adversely impact
setback from occupied structures would not have to be relocated to comply with subsequently
enacted 1,000-foot setbacks. See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:602.g (2019) (“Existing
producing facilities are exempt from the provisions of these regulations with respect to
minimum distance requirements and setbacks unless they are found by the Director to be
unsafe.”). Regulations of ongoing operations, however, such as those enacted for flowline
inspections and pressure tests or requirements for payments from production could apply to
both new and legacy facilities. See Independent Producers Marketing Corp. v. Cobb, 721
P.2d. 1106, 1109–10 (Wyo. 1986) (distinguishing between a law being retroactively applied
to past production versus prospectively applied to proceeds deriving from past production
but generated after the effective date).
442
It is too early to determine how California’s cap and trade program, which first
applied to upstream producers of oil and gas in 2015, will impact production and drilling
activities in the state. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801–96022 (2018).
443
See Pierce, supra note 5, at 777–78.
444
Id. at 762.
445
Gregg P. Macey, The Incomplete Ecology of Hydraulic Fracturing Governance, 50
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 583, 585–89 (2018); Qingmin Meng, Modeling and Prediction of Natural Gas
Fracking Pad Landscapes in the Marcellus Shale Region, USA, 121 LANDSCAPE & URB.
PLAN. 109, 113 (2014).
446
Newly developed drilling and completion techniques have reduced the
environmental footprint of some operations by allowing for multi-lateral and stacked-lateral
well pads. See Katie Mazerov, Pad-Drilling, On-Site Water Treatment Help Reduce Surface
Impact, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.drillingcontractor.org/paddrilling-on-site-water-treatment-help-reduce-surface-impact-27400 [https://perma.cc/H26G
-W5XJ]; Sarah J. Thompson et al., Avoidance of Unconventional Oil Wells and Roads
Exacerbates Habitat Loss for Grassland Birds in the North American Great Plains, 192
BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 82, 86 (2015).
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wildlife habitat and migration.447 Further, the site construction and drilling and
completion processes themselves require large energy and water inputs. Finally,
abandoned and unplugged wells can pose significant environmental risks by acting
as conduits between fresh water sources and deeper hydrocarbon-bearing
reservoirs.448
Environmental protection is incidental to the advancement of conservation law
purposes. Conservation agencies have not historically been considered
environmental agencies, and the focus of conservation law has been on encouraging
efficient production and maximizing the utility of the resources—not on the
preservation of ecosystems, beauty, or a stable climate. Nevertheless, surface
impacts are practically limited by oil and gas conservation regulations that prohibit
development in areas smaller than the area that one well can reasonably drain.449
Although the intent of spacing rules is to prevent waste, spacing and density
regulations limit the number of well sites, wells drilled, and surface disturbances.450
Further, rules to limit venting and flaring in order to prevent waste have significantly
limited the volumes of greenhouse gasses such as methane and carbon dioxide into
the atmosphere. While it is not possible to fully eliminate the surface environmental
impacts of oil and gas development, conservation regulation has been a driver in the
movement to limit the environmental impacts of oil and gas development.451 Without
changing the fundamental nature of oil and gas conservation agencies, agencies and
legislatures have unrealized opportunities to intentionally limit harm to the
environment through more targeted commission regulation and liberal conservation
strategies. A nuanced approach to regulation by commissions can advance the
environmental protection goals within the scope of traditional conservation
regulation.
Existing legislative delegations of authority to protect public health, safety, and
the environment allow conservation agencies to respond to emergent resource
conflicts and environmental concerns that are particular to oil and gas development
in the region through the adoption of preventative and managerial rules.
Conservation rules and orders provide mechanisms for operators and conservation
agencies to address the immediate externalities of oil and gas development, verify
compliance, and enforce environmental and health and safety rules during
operations.452 For example, North Dakota commission orders assure that companies
447

Macey, supra note 445, at 597; Joel Minor, Local Government Fracking
Regulations: A Colorado Case Study, 33 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 61, 72–73 (2014).
448
See Matthew K. Trawick, Cooperative Mineral Interest Development in the Lone
Star State: It’s Time to Mess with Texas, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 385, 404 (2015).
449
Id.
450
Innovations such as multi-well pads and stacked horizontal development have
increased drainage areas and thus have further reduced these impacts.
451
See Bruce M. Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How Requiring Environmental
Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. 599, 630 (2010)
452
COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:204 (2019); 055-0001-2 WYO. CODE R. § 3
(LexisNexis 2019).
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have appropriate plans for gas capture and pipeline infrastructure prior to drilling,
thus preventing unnecessary venting and flaring.453 In Colorado, where development
in urban areas and impacts on wildlife are greater concerns, the Colorado Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission has promulgated integrity management rules for
flowlines, aesthetic and noise control rules, and regulations for reclamation and
waste management.454 Commission rules take advantage of the agency’s subject
matter expertise in fossil fuel exploration and development to prevent anticipated
harms and managing environmental risk by verifying that proposed operations will
not violate uniform public governance mechanisms. For example, prior to granting
a permit to drill, some states have tasked agencies with verifying compliance with
setback regulations,455 split estate acts,456 and wildlife protection stipulations.457
Preventative rules promote environmental protection without directly conflicting
with agency purposes related to preventing waste and protecting correlative rights.
Conservation agencies can also limit environmental externalities by
encouraging resource-scale planning. Oil and gas reservoirs, like other landscapescale resources, “exceed the scope of individual parcels of land . . . .”458 Thus,
assembling resources across parcels and planning management on a resource scale
offers numerous benefits.459 The potential environmental and production benefits of
resource-scale development are significant. Thus, compulsory unitization regulation
may reduce externalities of oil and gas development by helping parties overcome
contracting failures and allowing for the combination of resources to maximize
recovery from the minimum number of wells.460 This may increase total recovery—

453
N.D. INDUS. COMM’N, ORDER 24665, POLICY/GUIDANCE VERSION 041718 (2018),
https://www.dmr.nd.gov/oilgas/GuidancePolicyNorthDakotaIndustrialCommissionorder24
665.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z79Y-MD4S] (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
454
COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM’N, COGCC RULES & REGULATIONS,
Series 800-1200 et seq. (2019).
455
See, e.g., COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:604.c(2) (requiring mitigation measures as
condition for approval wells located in setback areas); 055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. § 47
(defining and governing well surface setback requirements).
456
See, e.g., 055-0001-3 WYO. CODE R. § 8.
457
See, e.g., Governor Mark Gordon, Exec. Order No. 2019-3, Greater Sage-Grouse
Core Area Protection app. D (Aug. 21, 2019), https://wgfd.wyo.gov/WGFD/media/content/
PDF/Habitat/Sage%20Grouse/Governor-Gordon-Greater-Sage-Grouse-EO-2019-3_August
-21-2019_Final-Signed_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/RMP8-GRZZ]; COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 4041:1201–1205 (rules pertaining to wildlife protection).
458
Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2510 n.7 (2015).
459
Id. at 2518.
460
See Pierce, supra note 5, at 778; David Edward Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir
Development—An Alternative to the Rule of Capture for the Ownership and Development of
Oil and Gas, 4 J. ENERGY L. & POL’Y 1, 78–79 (1983); Bruce Kramer, Unitization: A Partial
Solution to the Issues Raised by Horizontal Well Development in Shale Plays, 68 ARK. L.
REV. 295, 318–19 (2015); see generally Gary Leibcap & Steven Wiggins, The Influence of
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thus minimizing waste—and address the issues while reducing environmental
impacts and conflicts with surface owners.461
One long-recognized method to assemble subsurface resources is exploratory
unitization. Exploratory unitization allows for the combination of property interests
overlying a common pool or source of supply and adoption of a plan of development
that allocates economic rights and responsibilities within the unit area.462 Current
well spacing rules are based on a fiction that all reservoirs are homogeneous and
drain radially.463 In contrast, unitization seeks to consolidate mineral interests across
the reservoir such that production can be carried out in the most efficient manner
based on geology and the maintenance of reservoir pressure, without regard to
competition, lease lines, or individual well regulations.464 Assemblage of subsurface
interests also proffers potential environmental benefits and facilitates greater
protection of surface resources. For example, unitization would protect the
correlative rights of owners who were restricted from drilling on their individual
parcels as a result of environmental concerns; under an area-wide unit agreement,
they would still share in production.
More widespread use of exploratory unitization could require legislative
authorization. Unitization can be accomplished voluntarily by agreement of mineral
and royalty owners, or compulsorily by statute. While used with some frequency on
federal lands,465 exploratory unitization of pools with a majority of private and state
land is less common. Unitization may also be prohibited or discouraged by antidilution provisions in oil and gas development agreements between companies and

Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization, 93 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 690 (1985).
461
Advocates of exploratory unitization posit that this will benefit all mineral owners
through maximizing production. However, it may operate to the detriment of individuals
since production is typically allocated on the basis of surface acreage rather than geologic
structure. Further, mineral owners outside the participating area of the initial well may find
their interests tied up before beginning to receive a share of production. See Gideon
Wiginton, Comment, Addressing Perceptions of Procedural Unfairness in Compulsory
Unitization by Appointing Neutral Experts, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1801, 1816 (2006).
462
Gary D. Libecap & Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common Pool:
Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 89–91 (1984); Steven B.
Richardson, The Unit Operating Agreement for Federal Exploratory Units, Federal Onshore
Oil and Gas Pooling and Unitization, Paper No. 16, 16-8. (Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Fdn. 2006).
463
Philip E. Norvell, Prelude to the Future of Shale Gas Development: Well Spacing
and Integration for the Fayetteville Shale in Arkansas, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 457, 468 (2010);
David Pierce, Sustaining the Unsustainable: Oil and Gas Development in the 21st Century,
23-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 362, 372 (2014).
464
Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES &
ENVT’L L. 277, 279 (2004).
465
30 C.F.R. §§ 212.20–212.34 (2019).
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landowners.466 These may prohibit unitization or encourage incremental, rather than
planned, development.467 Private developers and mineral owners may also have
individualistic concerns about equity or differential development timelines that
result in opposition. Unlike federal agencies, state oil and gas conservation laws may
not authorize the conservation agency to override these concerns and compel
unitization for exploratory development.468
The 2004 amendments to the Interstate Oil & Gas Commission model Oil and
Gas Conservation Act included an express provision for exploratory unitization.469
State conservation agencies would oversee this process to assure that the plan is
feasible and results in additional recovery and that the proposed allocation formula
is fair to all unit owners.470 Many state conservation statutes include compulsory
unitization provisions. However, not all states allow unitization for exploratory
purposes or allow a state to initiate unitization without an application from a majority
of the mineral and royalty interest owners in the affected unit.471 Appropriate
legislative authorizations can thus enable conservation agencies to enhance
environmental protections within the scope of their statutorily delegated purposes,
consistent with the agency’s expertise and familiarity with the technical operation
of the industry.
Oil and gas conservation commissions may also be able to encourage private
environmental governance on a resource scale by promulgating new rules to allow
mineral rights developers to voluntarily combine interests and modify well spacing
locations for the purpose of limiting surface and environmental impacts. Already,
surface owners and operators are addressing some of the most localized impacts of
development through private agreements such as participation agreements, joint
466

Bruce M. Kramer, Oil and Gas Leases and Pooling: A Look Back and a Peek Ahead,
45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 877, 893 (2013).
467
Id.
468
Pierce, supra note 5, at 764, 777; MARTIN & KRAMER, supra note 1, at §§ 18-1 to
18-27; Anderson & Smith, supra note 464, at 279. Exploratory unitization may be permitted
by WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-110(c) (2019), which provides “for the operation as a unit of
one (1) or more pools or parts thereof and for the pooling of the interests in the oil and gas
in the proposed unit area for the purpose of conducting such unit operation” (emphasis
added).
469
MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT, pt. VII, §§ 22-28 (INTERSTATE OIL &
GAS COMPACT COMM’N 2004), http://iogcc.ok.gov/Websites/iogcc/docs/ModelActDec2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/852E-VLSK]. However, although the model act offers a
“laudable improvement” over prior versions, it has not been adopted by all states. See Pierce,
supra note 5, at 766; Request for Agency Action of Petro-Hunt, LLC, for an Order
Establishing the Wales Exploratory Unit, Finding of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order,
Docket No. 2006-015, Cause No. 176-04 (Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, Utah Dep’t of Nat.
Res., Jan. 12, 2007), https://fs.ogm.utah.gov/bbooks/OGMBOARD/OilGas/176-04/17604_2006-015.o001.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UZ4-9Q83].
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D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND.
L. REV. 1183, 1228 (2013).
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Anderson & Smith, supra note 464, at 285.
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operating agreements, development agreements, and surface use agreements.
Colorado’s oil and gas conservation commission, again, provides a leading example
of how conservation agencies can encourage this type of collaborative
environmental problem solving through public regulation. The COGCC has
provided operators with the option to develop minerals according to comprehensive
drilling plans (CDPs).472 CDPs “are intended to identify foreseeable oil and gas
activities in a defined geographic area, facilitate discussions about potential impacts,
and identify measures to minimize adverse impacts to public health, safety, welfare,
and the environment, including wildlife resources, from such activities.”473 As part
of a CDP, an operator may combine multiple proposed locations into a customized
plan to “address specific issues in a particular area.”474 Operators are encouraged to
work with local governments and surface owners throughout the development of the
CDP, thus providing additional support for the negotiation of private governance
instruments to protect environmental and surface interests.475
Changes to well spacing rules may also limit the environmental impacts of oil
and gas development. Frequently, surface well locations are required to be near or
along a property line or located in the center of a wellbore spacing unit. In the
absence of a variance, these requirements may increase the likelihood of conflicts
between mineral developers and environmental or surface resources, which are
frequently constructed along section line roads. Colorado also addressed this issue
through new wellbore spacing rules developed for the Wattenberg formation.476 In
combination, these rules may permit an operator to engage in collaborative and
comprehensive planning for regional development in a manner that reduces impacts
to surface landowners and the environment. Administrative processes that provide
flexibility in well and facility locations offer operators an opportunity to avoid
surface resources without resulting in underground waste.
Commission rules that encourage exploratory unitization, comprehensive
drilling plans, and spacing rules may significantly enhance opportunities for private
governance protection of landscape-scale environmental resources.477 Whereas split
estate acts enhance environmental protection on a parcel-by-parcel basis,478
unitization processes that require collaboration and consultation with local
472
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governments and public and private landowners may increase environmental
protections and provide for more widespread distribution of production benefits. For
instance, public landowner agreements are becoming increasingly sophisticated.479
Many Colorado counties have established processes for entering into memoranda of
understanding or development agreements, through which developers and the
county formally agree how oil and gas will be developed.480 Agreements may
include stakeholder assessments or require the operator to make substantial
investments into public infrastructure.481 In contrast to the failures of conflicting
regulatory governance,482 conservation laws and rules that facilitate bargaining
among environmental groups, local governments, and landowners may better
address environmental externalities.
Conservation agency oversight is necessary to assure that private governance
approaches to resource-scale planning do not result in distributive inequities that
exacerbate environmental justice concerns.483 Unlike public governance
mechanisms with uniform rules that apply to all parcels, communities may choose
to locate oil and gas facilities and other high impact activities in less affluent areas
that already enjoy fewer environmental services.484 To mitigate this risk,
conservation rules encouraging resource planning should require coordination and
consultation with both social and environmental groups, including those “comprised
of individuals from disproportionately burdened communities.”485 Further, agency
approval of voluntary unitization or other comprehensive drilling plans is critical to
479
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assure that private agreements for resource development advance public interests
and also meet an objective standard of fairness and equity. Agency authorizations
should also include factors related to environmental justice, such as whether a
proposed resource development plan disproportionately impacts certain groups or
shifts risks from one population to another.486 Procedural statutes that require
agencies to consider environmental impacts, including environmental justice, may
increase the transparency of agency decision-making and provide avenues for
meaningful judicial review.
VII. CONCLUSION
Oil and gas conservation agencies have been instrumental in limiting waste and
environmental externalities from oil and gas production activities through well
spacing regulations, compulsory pooling, and prohibitions on wild wells.487
However, for most of its history, environmental protection has been an incidental
benefit of conservation law rather than its underlying purpose. Instead, the oil and
gas conservation statutes “in every state operate on a capture-based property model”
that tacitly accepts environmental degradation and environmental drilling as
normative.488 This model prioritizes the prevention of waste and the protection of
each individual’s right to capture his share of the minerals over limiting
environmental harms.
In recent years, environmental constituencies and landowners are questioning
the primacy of capture-based paradigms, instead prioritizing protection of surface
and environmental interests.489 As a result, environmental activism in administrative
proceedings before oil and gas conservation agencies has increased. Concerned
citizens, including surface owners and environmental groups, have pushed
conservation commissions and legislatures to promulgate new environmental rules
and revise oil and gas conservation statutes.490 Environmental groups have used
citizen petitions and environmental review provisions of procedural statutes to open
up conservation agencies and push for greater democratization of oil and gas
regulation.491 As a result, conservation agencies have been forced to reconcile
structural conflicts between broad, aspirational directives of protecting health,
safety, and public welfare, with specific and historically-entrenched mandates of
preventing waste and protecting correlative rights.492 These proceedings have rarely
overcome agency inertia, instead leading to activism in the courts, at the ballot box,
486
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and before the legislature.493 Some limited successes in those arenas have created
standing for environmental advocates, pushed agencies to initiate rulemaking
proceedings, and created new precedents and legislation by which agencies can
afford greater consideration for environmental impacts.494 The result has
transformed conservation agencies and oil and gas conservation law. Oil and gas
regulators have emerged as inadvertent—and often reluctant—environmental
agencies tasked with conflicting and co-equal policy goals. Without a clear hierarchy
and guidance regarding the factors agencies are required to consider and the relative
weights between them, these mandates may lead to disparate results, increase
litigation regarding agency discretion, and make agencies vulnerable to capture.
There is an opportunity for more intentional environmental regulation by oil
and gas agencies in a manner that complements, rather than conflicts, with agencies’
traditional purposes of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights.
Conservation agencies can accomplish a better balance between efficient
development and environmental protection. Legislatures and environmental
advocates should consider reforming state oil and gas conservation statutes to
empower agencies to protect environmental resources through spacing and pooling,
early-stage exploratory unitization, and resource scale planning. Legislatures should
also enact laws that encourage participation by social and environmental groups in
early siting decisions and the regulation of surface impacts. These changes may
encourage private governance solutions to resource-scale problems in a manner that
increases total reservoir recoveries and preserves the correlative rights of mineral
owners.
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